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ABSTRACT 
The restructuring of electric industry is ongoing in countries all over the world. The goal of restructuring is 
to transform the electric market from a cost-based monopolistic environment to a price-based competitive 
market. Electric market dynamic problems, as observed in real markets after restructuring, need to be studied to 
improve market design and maintain market reliability. 
Under the framework developed in [Sheblé, 1999a], this work simulates electric market dynamic using 
systems theory, decision analysis and decision theory. Activities of Generation Companies (GENCOs), the most 
active players in electric markets, and their impact on market performances are also examined. Decision-making 
of GENCOs and interactions between them are studied using decision analysis and decision theory. 
The first part of this study studies electric market dynamics: dynamics of electricity price, generation 
output, and other variables. The problem is examined from the viewpoint of an Independent Contract 
Administrator (ICA) to simulate market performance and GENCOs' activities in different situations. These 
situations include various interactions among GENCOs (different expectations for competitors adopted by 
GENCOs), competition types (quantity competition, price competition, both price and quantity competition), 
market risk levels (decisions under certainty and uncertainty), and different market organizations (with and 
without certain market information feedback) in the electric market. Decision-making of GENCOs and 
interactions between them are modeled as control processes and electric markets are modeled as control 
systems. The corresponding market dynamics is simulated and market dynamic properties are obtained. 
Simulation results show that interactions between market participants, as well as market risk levels, competition 
types, and market organizations, are important to market participant's activities and have significant impact on 
market performances and properties. Results also show that properties of GENCOs and their decisions have 
important effects on market performance. Sometimes their legitimate actions may even cause market dynamic 
problems. Models developed and conclusions obtained can help ICA study activities of market participants and 
simulate market performance, thus improve market design and maintain market reliability. 
The second part of this study is from GENCOs' viewpoint to develop optimal decision-making strategies 
and models in short term. First of all, GENCOs decision problem in short term in new deregulated environment 
is identified as a three-dimension problem: how to make optimal decisions for different time in different 
geographical markets in different service markets to maximize total gain. Then, a new market-based generation 
scheduling scheme is proposed to solve this problem. Market rules, competitor's activities, uncertainty in the 
market, bidding strategies, and short-term generation technical constraints are included in the scheme and 
analyzed using decision analysis and decision theory. Next, Dynamic Programming (DP) and Stochastic 
Dynamic Programming (SDP) are adopted to solve the new scheduling problems. Results show that in new 
environment, GENCOs' optimal generation schedules may be very different from schedules proposed in 
previous work. The GENCO short-term decision-making scheme developed can be used to model GENCOs in 
market dynamic models to get detailed market simulation results. Finally, GENCOs' decision-making in 
term is compared with short term and the method to study GENCO long-term decision-making is proposed. 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of this study 
1.1.1 Electric power industry restructuring 
The restructuring of the electric industry has already taken place in countries all over the world. In the 
United States, the restructuring process has already happened in California, Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland 
(PJM), Texas (ERCOT), as well as in many other states. The goal of restructuring is to promote competition-to 
change the electric industry from a cost-based monopolistic environment to a price-based competitive market. 
The underlying economic reason is to introduce competition in a competitive market that achieves Pareto 
efficiency (or Pareto optimality), which is desired in the economics [Dinger, 1998]. Pareto efficiency is 
accomplished when it is impossible to make one party better off without making another party worse off. 
Meanwhile, social surplus, the sum of consumer surplus and supplier surplus (profit), is maximized in 
competitive market [Shy, 1995]. In a competitive market, price is determined by demand and supply. This is 
different from what happened in previous regulated electric industry, where price was determined by regulators 
to give a reasonable rate of return for the industry. 
Many market frameworks have been suggested for a new electric market. The framework used in this study 
is taken from [Sheblé, 1999a], shown in Figure 1.1. This framework also fits into Locational Marginal Pricing 
(LMP) model in the Standard Market Design (SMD) recently proposed by Federal Energy Reliablity Council 
(FERC). One key component of the framework is auction, considered to be a proper pricing mechanism for 
competitive market. A variety of auction structures have been proposed and adopted in different electric markets 
[Post, 1995][Sheblé, 1996]. Auction used in this work is the single-sided auction. 
Currently, the changing of the electric market in the U.S. is still ongoing. A lot of experience, as well as 
important lessons, have been gained. As deregulation of the electric industry proceeds, many important 
problems have emerged. Electric market dynamics is one of them. 
1.1.2 Electric market dynamics 
Electric market dynamics refers to the dynamic evolving processes of electricity price, output, and other 
variables in the market. The study of electric market dynamics describes and predicts how market rules influence 
actions of market participants, how market participants respond to market conditions, and how market 
participants interact with each other in different situations. 
2 
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Figure 1.1 Market frameworks for the new environment 
Electric market dynamics is important to electric market design, regulation, and management. Through 
dynamic studies, dynamic problems (such as unexpected overly volatile price dynamics) could be predicted and 
identified. Then, market design and market rules could be improved and these problems might be prevented. 
The activities of market participants, such as different production and trading decisions, could be simulated and 
forecasted. Activities that may lead to electric market problems could be noticed and actions may be taken in 
advance to eliminate them. 
It has been seen in practice that in the electric market, market rules, market organizations, and activities of 
market participants could lead to very severe problems. What happened in California's electric market is a good 
example. Figure 1.2 shows the price dynamics in the California electric market from 1997 to 2000 [CAISO, 
2001]. Besides price fluctuations around the normal level, there were many unexpected, extremely high price 
spikes. Consumers paid a lot based on this price. Obviously one of the goals of deregulation of electric industry-
to reduce cost to the consumer-was not achieved. It is believed that reasons for this unusual price dynamics 
included market structure design flaws and manipulation of markets by market players. How this happened and 
what we can do in the future to prevent similar problems are within the range of market dynamic analysis. 
Why should electric market dynamics, instead of the equilibrium analysis approach, be stressed? This is 
because dynamic market analysis can provide important and unique information. Equilibrium analysis can find 
possible steady states in a market. However, sometimes even if there is equilibrium in a market, it may not be 
reached. Whether the equilibrium is achievable depends on both the state of market and the activities of market 
participants. [Roth, 1995], [Erev, 1998] reported some experiments where an equilibrium existed, but it was 
never reached due to specific activities of market participants. 
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Figure 1.2 Daily price indices for western market hubs, California. 1997-2000 
Moreover, it is the impacts of market rules on market participants and interactions among market 
participants that are important to the market. Not only whether market variables will reach certain steady states 
and where they are moving, but also how they reach these states should be known, because variable transition 
processes may be different even if the final equilibrium of variables is the same. Figure 1.3 shows various price 
dynamics in an electric market under different conditions [Yang, 2000]. In the same market and with the same 
cost characteristics of market participants, different expectations of market participants make different price 
equilibriums in cases 1, 2 and 3. It can also be seen that prices in the base case and case 1 converge to the same 
equilibrium but price transitions in the two cases are quite different. In summary, dynamic studies are necessary 
to ensure that the market is evolving in the right direction and in expected manner. 
1.1.3 Generation company decision-making 
In the past vertically integrated electricity industry, the price of electricity was set by regulators in order to 
give the industry a reasonable rate of return. The risk faced by generation companies (GENCOs) was little and 
the activities of GENCOs were basically cost-based. What GENCOs needed to do to maximize profit was to 
minimize cost by generation scheduling and operations. Economic dispatch, unit commitment, and other 
algorithms were used to schedule short-term generation and generation capacity planning algorithms were used 
in the long-term to meet demands with certain reliability at the least cost [Wood, 1996][Wang 1994]. 
Meanwhile, GENCOs did not compete directly with each other. 
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Figure 1.3 Different price transitions in an electric market under quantity competition 
In a restructured electric market, the electricity price that may be paid to each GENCO is set by the 
GENCO itself. Whether that price is accepted in the market is decided by market conditions: demand properties, 
activities of other GENCOs, etc. The activities of GENCOs become profit based [Richter, 1999] and GENCOs 
are exposed to market risk. In both short-term and long-term, GENCOs have to consider many new important 
factors in the market, such as market structures effect and uncertainty, to make decisions on generation 
scheduling, bidding, and planning activities. Competitors' activities also become important to GENCOs' 
decisions. GENCOs need to know activities of their competitors and take corresponding action because they are 
now competing face-to-face. In short, the decision-making of GENCOs has become very different and must be 
studied. 
1.2 Problem statement 
GENCOs are one of the most important players in market and their activities have changed a lot since 
deregulation. GENCOs' activities also have vital impacts on electric market performance and are believed to be 
in many cases the key reason for market dynamic problems, such as overly high price volatility, market power 
and market concentrations (defined in section 2.3.5). 
This work studies GENCO optimal decisions in deregulated electric market to see what decisions/ strategies 
are optimal for GENCOs in different situations. These decisions/strategies help GENCOs maximize profit and 
are most likely to be adopted by GENCOs in real market. Based on the GENCO decision models developed, 
electric markets are simulated to study market performances and whether and how those GENCO decisions lead 
to any market dynamic problems. 
GENCO decisions and market simulation will be studied from a new viewpoint using system theory, 
decision analysis and decision theory. GENCOs' optimal decision-makings are to be modeled as control 
5 
processes and short-term electric markets as control systems. Interactions between GENCOs are very important 
to market performances. Those interactions are to be represented by different expectations formed by GENCOs 
and their effects on GENCO decision-making and market performance are to be examined. Dynamic properties 
of short-term electric markets, including equilibrium, market power, market share, controllability, observability 
and transition process, are to be studied in different market situations to evaluate market performance and 
identify possible market problems, such as overly high prices and market power problems. This work also 
develops strategies and methods to help GENCO make market-based short-term generation scheduling and 
pricing decisions in deregulated market to maximize profit in new environment. These strategies will consider 
various technical constraints, economical constraints, market conditions, and interactions between GENCOs. 
How to apply the method and solve short-term generation scheduling problems using existing techniques is to be 
studied. To show the whole picture of electric market dynamics, long-term electric market dynamic study is to 
be compared with short-term and how to conduct the long- term study is to be discussed. 
Since market participants have different objectives and constraints in different time horizons, dynamic 
problems in the electric market can be classified into two categories according to time scales: short-term 
dynamics and long-term dynamics [Amin, 2000][Vittal, 2000]. The time scales of these categories and those of 
the physical power system dynamics are illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4 Time scales for physical power system and electric market dynamics 
The power system and electric market are interrelated and their dynamics are related, too. Generally 
speaking, when two coupled systems have very different time constants/time scales, they can be decoupled 
[Blackbill, 1958]. The electric market studied in this work is mainly about one type of the short-term markets, 
day ahead market, in which generators submit bids for the next day and the market administrator selects bids 
based on economic and system reliability concerns. As shown in Figure 1.4, the electric market has a much 
larger time scale than that for electromechanical effects of oscillations in motors and generators and tie-line load 
frequency control in power systems. When the dynamics of variables in the day ahead electric market are 
6 
studied, variables in the power system dynamic processes can be assumed to have already reached a steady state. 
Then, the day ahead electric market dynamics can be decoupled with power system dynamic processes. This is 
similar to decoupling of power system transient stability analysis and dynamics of power system components 
(such as dynamics of impedance and capacitors). 
This study first builds basic GENCO decision model and electric market models. These models are used to 
simulate electricity price, generation output, and other variable dynamics in different market situations to get 
market dynamic properties and detect possible market problems. The modeling problem is examined from the 
viewpoint of an Independent Contract Administrator (ICA) to predict activities of GENCOs and market 
performance. Models developed and conclusions obtained can help ICA to improve market design and maintain 
market reliability. The following problems are studied: 
1) How to model GENCOs decision-making processes and simulate market variables dynamic processes 
in different short-term market situations, including 
• different GENCO expectations; 
• different competitions (quantity competition, price competition, price and quantity competition); 
• different market organizations; 
• different gain maximizing horizon (single period maximization and multi-period total gain 
expectations); 
• with and without uncertainty. 
2) What are the electric market dynamic characteristics in the above situations, including 
• stability criteria and equilibrium calculation; 
• equilibrium properties, including market power and market share ; 
• different transition processes and 
• market properties as control system, controllability and observability. 
Then, this study develops complete optimal decision model and procedures in detail for GENCOs to 
maximize gain in short-term market in different situations. The model can also be used to represent GENCOs 
activities in the market and put into market dynamic models to get detailed market simulation results. The 
following problem is studied: how to develop an optimal short-term decision-making procedure for GENCOs to 
maximize gain with effects of: 
• market organizations; 
• short-term technical constraints; 
• short-term market constraints; 
• bidding strategy and 
• uncertainty. 
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Long-term electric market dynamics with the effect of investment and generation expansion is also overviewed. 
This study compares long-term dynamics with short-term dynamics and suggests the method to study long-term 
dynamics. 
1.3 Organization of this dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as following: Chapter 1 overviews the electric market dynamics problems and 
this work. Chapter 2 reviews literature and chooses methods used. In Chapter 3 to chapter 6, how to apply 
systems theory, decision analysis and decision theory to model the electric market dynamics is studied. In 
chapter 3, market dynamics under quantity competition with effects of market participants' expectations are 
simulated. Chapter 4 shows how market dynamics under quantity competition under market participants' 
expectations with uncertainty are modeled. In Chapter 5, market dynamics under quantity competition under 
different expectations to maximize total profit in multiple periods is studied. Market dynamics under other 
competition-price competition, price and quantity competition-under market participants' expectations is 
studied in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 and 8, decision models for GENCOs in the short-term electric market and 
generation scheduling problems, are studied in detail. In Chapter 7, a preliminary analysis is performed to 
examine GENCOs decision problems in different time horizon and various numbers of markets. Chapter 8 
discusses details of the problem, shows how to reformulate the problem and solve it by using Dynamic 
Programming or Stochastic Dynamic Programming, and provides numerical examples. Chapter 9 overviews 
GENCO decision in long- term, compares them with short-term decisions, and recommends real options theory 
to study long-term GENCO decision. In Chapter 10, this study is concluded and future work is discussed. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW, BASIC CONCEPTS, AND METHODS 
2.1 Chapter overview 
In this chapter, literature in electric market modeling and GENCO decision-making are reviewed. Important 
methods used in electric market dynamic analysis are compared and systems theory is chosen to model and 
simulate the electric market in this study. Previous studies in GENCO decision-making using decision analysis 
and decision theory are examined. Basic concepts and application processes of systems theory, decision 
analysis, and decision theory method are overviewed. 
2.2 Literature review 
In this section, commodity market modeling and market strategy are examined first. Then, electricity 
demand and supply modeling methods are reviewed. Next, work on the relationship between market dynamics 
and power system dynamics is analyzed. Methods utilized in market dynamic study are also compared. Finally, 
work on GENCOs short-term decision-making is examined. 
2.2.1 Commodity market modeling 
In the general commodity market dynamic study area, [Labys, 1973] and [Labys, 1984] built a solid 
framework of commodity market dynamic modeling. [Sage, 1983] and [Ruth, 1997] showed how to conduct 
economic system dynamic analysis using system engineering methods. [Hennessy, 1999] studied the decision 
making in multi-stage decision making process in commodity market. 
Actions of market participants and market dynamics are limited by market structures. Though the goal of 
restructuring is to make electric markets competitive, the current electricity market is not completely competitive 
and it is still necessary to consider the effects of different market structures on market participant decisions. 
[Shy, 1995] studied market structures in industry - monopolistic, oligopolistic, monopolistically competitive, 
etc. [Besanko, 2000] examined strategies in different market structures and different time scales. [Baye, 2000] 
showed the importance of information flow to interactions in the market and summarized strategies of firms in 
different market structures, including pricing strategies. 
2.2.2 Electric market modeling 
Electricity is a special commodity (for example, it cannot be stored) and needs to be treated specially. 
[Pachauri, 1975] developed an interdisciplinary approach to study the dynamic behavior of electric market, 
including an analysis in electric market demand and supply. [Green, 2000] studied the economic foundations of 
competitions in the generation area. The generation competition was considered as a special case of the general 
competitive market. [[Mansour, 2000] discussed important characteristics of competitions in electric market. 
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Market dynamics and GENCOs decisions in different market structures have been studied. [Maiorano, 
2000] built an oligopolistic market model on the basis of Cournot model for analysis of a non-collusive 
oligopolistic market. [Yu, 2000] presented a Stackelberg price leadership model for electricity markets 
consisting of a few large producers and a large number of fringe producers. [Otero-Novas, 2000] compared 
various coordination schemes and pricing strategies of market participants in competitive and oligopolistic 
markets. [Skantze, 1999] evaluated trading activities stochastically in California's electric market with price 
data after the opening of the California Power Exchange. [Hie, 2000] reviewed and compared strategies as well 
as decision-making processes for generation companies in the regulatory and competitive markets in different 
time scales. 
Market participant may have incentives to manipulate the market to make more profit. [Petrov, 1999] 
showed how market participants could manipulate electric market auctions by causing economic instabilities. 
[Petrov, 2000] modeled an agent-driven bilateral electric market auction, where one market player modeled the 
other by a rule-based decision tree developed using genetic programming and tried to manipulate the market. 
2.2.3 Methods utilized in market dynamic study 
Several methods have been utilized to model electric market dynamics. These methods include systems 
theory, game theory, stochastic modeling, and adaptive agent systems. 
2.2.3.1 Systems theory 
[Alvarado, 1999] [Alvarado, 2000] addressed stability problems in the electric market and analyzed market 
stability criteria with energy imbalance. Demand and supply were modeled, respectively. [Yang, 2000] studied 
stability criteria for the electric auction market in a discrete timeframe. GENCOs made production decisions 
with expectations of market price to maximize profit and consumers did the same to maximize utility. [Perez-
Arriaga, 1997] suggested models for wholesale market pricing to maximize net social benefit with consideration 
of short-term operating and long-term planning constraints. [Stothert, 2000] modeled the electric market as a 
control system and the competitive bidding process as a control problem. The effect of introducing bidding 
rounds into the bidding processes was investigated. 
2.2.3.2 Game theory 
[Visudhiphan, 1999] modeled bidding in the electric market as a dynamic gaming process: generation 
companies found market opportunities on an interval basis (hourly, daily, or both), then evaluated and modified 
the next bid according to specific strategies. [Nguyen, 2000] introduced a method based on game theory to 
determine electric market stability in a competitive market, which is applicable to any differentiate generation 
cost and consumer utility functions. [Correis, 2002] studied the activities in the electric market as repeated 
playing of similar games. 
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2.2.3.3 Stochastic modeling 
[Kian, 2001] presented a stochastic method to model electricity price. Price is stochastically computed 
based on important factors such as consumer consumption, demand elasticity, generation and transmission 
outage schedules, reserve requirements, and market participants' strategic behaviors. [Skantze, 2000] showed 
relationships between electricity prices in a multi-market environment. Electricity demand and supply were 
modeled as stochastic processes, respectively, and then price was determined by interactions between demand 
and supply. 
2.2.3.4 Adaptive agent systems 
Adaptive agent systems could simulate complex decision-making processes, such as learning. [Nicolaisen, 
2000] studied market power and market efficiency for a wholesale electric market using adaptive agent systems. 
Both buyers and sellers are modeled as agents using Roth-Erev learning algorithms in a double-sided auction. 
[Harp, 2000] developed a software tool to study the electric market using adaptive systems in which agents used 
Q-learning to improve decision-making. The physical power system, as well as the electric market, was modeled 
and transmission network limitations were included. 
2.2.3.5 Methods comparison 
Important applications of four main methods utilized in the study of electric market dynamics have been 
reviewed. Advantages and drawbacks of these methods are summarized in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Comparison of method utilized in the electric market dynamic analysis 
Methods Advantages Drawbacks 
Systems 
theory 
• Models are easy to understand; 
relationship between market variables 
can be explicitly revealed; 
• Schemes to adjust system properties are 
easy to develop. 
• Some complex processes are 
difficult to model; 
• Some details in objectives being 
modeled must be omitted. 
Game 
theory 
• It is easy to conduct strategy analysis; 
• It may be easy to find equilibrium and 
study interactions among market 
participants. 
• System dynamic processes are 
difficult to find; 
• System convergence is difficult to 
predict and cannot always be 
assured. 
Stochastic 
modeling 
• Able to study market variables 
volatility; 
• Uncertainty in market can be included. 
• Results are only statistically 
meaningful; 
• It is difficult to develop schemes to 
adjust system characteristics. 
Adaptive 
Agent 
systems 
• A natural way to simulate independent 
entity in markets; 
• Complex decision processes can be 
modeled in details. 
• System convergence is difficult to 
predict and cannot always be 
assured. 
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2.2.4 Decision analysis and its applications for GENCOs 
Decision analysis could systematically handle various constraints in the decisions process and include 
uncertainty into decision-making. [Raiffa, 1970] showed how to solve specific problems using decision analysis 
with consideration of risk and objective evaluation criteria. [Clemen, 2000] showed a framework to 
systematically make decisions with a consideration of the objective, different alternatives, and outcomes. 
[Skinner, 1999] showed how to apply decision analysis in practice. Principles for good decision-making were 
summarized and a scalable decision process applicable to both small and large projects was presented. 
Decision analysis has been applied to GENCOs decisions in the new environment. [Sheblé, 1999b] 
summarized the decision analysis processes for GENCOs to incorporate economic decisions with uncertainty. 
Decision analysis procedures and applications, including contract selection and reserve requirement costing, 
were provided. [Yang 2002a] [Yang, 2000c] studied how to apply decision analysis for GENCOs and model 
different GENCO decision-making with uncertainty and information about competitors. [Yang 2002b] built a 
generation scheduling model based on decision analysis for GENCOs in the short-term electric market with 
uncertainty and estimate of market information. 
2.2.5 Summary 
The importance of the electric market dynamic study has been realized. The majority of the previous work 
in this area is equilibrium analysis, which is not enough. Some work has been done in stability criteria and 
dynamic process analysis. But, more work must be done to systematically include the effects of different 
factors—market structures, interaction between market participants, technical constraints, economic/financial 
concerns, different time scales—into market dynamic analysis. 
Some work has been done in developing the decision-making model for GENCOs in the electric market. 
However, new factors brought about by restructuring to the decision-making of GENCOs, such as market 
structure effects, technical constraints, economic/financial objectives and constraints, uncertainty and market 
risk, and interaction between competitors, need to be systematically studied and included in GENCOs' decision­
making in future work. 
2.3 Basic concepts and methods 
2.3.1 Methods to be used 
Based on the literature review and comparisons of methods used to study the electric market dynamics in 
section 2.2.3, this work choose to use systems theory to study the electric market dynamics. Besides all the 
advantages of systems theory described in section 2.2.3, this is mainly because studying market dynamics is 
important for market reliability and efficiency and using systems theory also helps improve market design and 
develop control scheme. Basic GENCO decision models are used to represent GENCOs' decisions in the 
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electric market model. The decision processes of GENCOs are modeled as control process and the electric 
market is modeled using system theory. 
Decision analysis could systematically handle constraints on GENCOs' decisions and include uncertainty 
into the decision-making process. This work will apply decision analysis to GENCOs' decision-making in the 
short-term in the new environment. Decision analysis could include strategic analysis and uncertainty into 
GENCOs' decisions, which are typical advantages of stochastic modeling and game theory, and could 
supplement the systems theory. As rational decision makers, GENCOs will use these models since they want to 
maximize profit and these models are good approximation of real GENCOs' decision-making. 
2.3.2 State space model 
Systems theory studies transitions and changes of variables with time. A control system usually can be 
described by state space equations. A typical system state space model is 
X ( t )  =  A ( t ) X ( t )  +  B ( t ) U ( t )  
y(f) = c(f)X(f)+D(f)c/(f) 
where X(t) are state variables, U(t) are input variables, Y(t) are output variables, A(t), B(t), C(t), and D(t) are 
system matrices. In the discrete form, system state space model is 
X ( k  + 1 )  =  A ( k ) X  ( k )  +  B ( k ) U ( k )  
Y ( k )  =  C ( k ) X ( k )  +  D ( k ) U ( k )  
In an electric market, the electricity price (and other variables) can be seen as a function of time and it is not 
changing all the time. The transactions of electricity are usually completed in different periods, such as day. The 
price in each period is constant and may change every period. Price is not always continuous: it might 
experience a sharp increase/decrease in two successive periods. This is most obvious when auction is adopted in 
the electric market. An auction is held at the beginning of every period. Then, the price is set and does not 
change during this period. All electricity suppliers and consumers cannot change the market price until next 
auction. Therefore, electric market dynamics would be better studied in a discrete time setting, which is adopted 
in this work. 
2.3.3 Decision analysis 
Decision analysis is a probabilistic framework to assist in logical discussions, compare alternatives, and find 
optimal actions by decision-makers. It provides a means to make good decisions, which is logically consistent 
with the state of information and incorporates alternatives with associated probabilities and potential outcomes 
in accordance with decision-maker's risk attitude. Decision analysis consists of three processes: structuring 
problem, evaluate alternatives, and select course of actions. The structure of decision analysis is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1 [Skinner, 2000]. 
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• Identify objective 
• Generate creative 
alternative 
• Model the problem 
mathematically 
Structure 
• Find optimal policy 
• Calculate the value 
of information 
• Identify information 
sources 
Course of actions 
• Create value function 
• Perform sensitivity 
analysis 
• Identify sensitive 
variables 
• Assess probability 
analysis distribution on 
sensitivity variables 
• Create risk profiles; 
perform probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis 
Evaluation 
Figure 2.1 Structure of decision analysis 
Various decision models can be used to structure decision problems and evaluate different actions. The 
most common tools include decision trees, influence diagrams, and Monte Carlo simulations. Decision trees use 
tree-like structures to represent situations, actions, and results. One major advantages of the decision tree is the 
ability to indicate sequences of decisions and uncertainties. A decision tree for a bet-or-not-bet game is shown in 
Figure 2.2. The objective of the game is to maximize expected dollar value. The alternative actions are "bet" 
and "not bet." 
Win 
Bet 
Lose 
Don't bet 
$50 
-$20 
Figure 2.2 Decision tree for a bet-or-not-bet game 
Risk attitude is important in decision-making. There are three kinds of risk attitudes: risk aversion, risk 
neutrality, and risk seeking. Different risk attitudes are shown in Figure 2.3. For a risk neutral person, the 
expected dollar value in the "bet-or-not-bet" game can be seen as same as the utility. When 50*p-20*(l-p) is 
greater than 0, a risk neutral person will choose to bet. For the same probability p, a risk averse or risk seeking 
person may have a different choice because of different risk attitudes. 
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Risk neutral 
Utility 
Risk averse 
/ Risk seeking 
wealth 
Figure 2.3 Different risk attitudes 
2.3.4 Decision theory 
Decision theory studies how to make a series of decisions and take a series of actions in a state space, where 
the changes of state are controlled by those decisions and actions. It includes both deterministic and stochastic 
studies. An example of deterministic decision theory application is to maximize utilities in a multi-stage horizon. 
An example of stochastic application of decision theory is the Markov systems [Bather, 2000]. 
Decision theory makes a series of decisions in accordance with current available information. These 
decisions include actions for current time and those for implementation in the future. As time proceeds, new 
information may emerge. Decision theory will update all information in the decision-making process to make the 
best decisions with an updated information set. Such a dynamic process is illustrated in Figure 2.4. Transitions 
of decision variables during this dynamic process are modeled using systems theory and studied in this work. 
Decision theory and decision analysis are closely related. They both study how to make decisions to 
achieve a pre-defined goal. One of the major differences between decision analysis and decision theory is that 
decision analysis is a static decision-making process—how to make a decision at a time—while decision theory 
applications are dynamic decision-making processes. Decision theory studies how to make a series of decisions 
with interaction among those decisions. A decision theory application can be seen as a multi-stage decision 
analysis with interrelationships among decisions and actions in each stage. 
15 
time 
1 n 
Figure 2.4 A dynamic decision-making process 
2.3.5 Indices for market performance 
The following important market properties in equilibrium are calculated in later studies: market share, 
market power, market controllability, and market observability. Definitions of these indices are discussed below. 
• Market Share: let q, be the output of GENCO i. The market share of GENCO i (MS, ) is defined as 
Market share indicates the degree of concentration in one market and is widely used one of the key 
indicator for market power. A higher than average market share means one firm outputs more than an 
average firm. The maximum market share is 100%, which indicates the firm is a monopoly. A market 
with overly high market share should be intervened by market regulators to maintain competition in the 
market and eliminate market power problems. 
• Market Power: Currently a widely accepted definition of market power doesn't exist. Here the 
definition from [Nicolaisen, 2001] is used, let 7Tcei be the profits that GENCOs would obtain in the 
competitive market and 7ll be the profits that GENCOs obtain in the market studied. The market 
power of GENCO i  (  M P f  ) is defined as 
[Shy, 1995] 
MP, = 
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A positive MP indicates an ability of the GENCO to exert control over the price of electricity in the 
market and obtain profit higher than the competitive profits. GENCOs with less profit in the market 
than they would have in perfect competitive market would have MP<0. Market power might be 
exhibited if a MP is much greater than zero. 
• Market controllability as a system 
The system 
X ( k  + 1 )  =  A ( k ) X ( k )  +  B ( k ) U ( k )  
Y ( k )  =  C ( k ) X ( k )  +  D ( k ) U ( k )  
is said to be controllable if for any initial state x(0) = X0  and a final state X l  there exists an input that 
transfers XQ to Xx in a finite time [Chen, 1999]. The system is controllable if and only if the matrix 
[B A B  A 2 B  A"* '5] has full row rank, where " n B  " is the rank of system matrix B. 
If an electric market is controllable for market administrators (assume the input is from market 
administrator), it is possible for market administrators to adjust market system state variable (output of 
GENCOs) and finally adjust market output (market price) when necessary. If the market is 
uncontrollable, market administrator may not influence market output through the input. Market rules 
or market organizations may have to be changed to achieve desired market performances. 
If the market input is from a GENCO and the market is controllable, the GENCO can adjust 
market state variable (outputs of GENCOs) and finally adjust market output (market price). In other 
words, GENCOs may control output of other GENCOs. Then, there are market power problems. 
One interesting and important problem is when the system is not controllable, whether some state 
variables (output decisions of some GENCOs) are controllable to other GENCOs. This is the problem 
of partial controllability. When some competitors are controllable to a GENCO, it will take advantage 
of this and change output of its competitors and market price. Therefore, there will be market power 
problems and intervention may become necessary. 
In this work, market controllability is studied for the whole market system and from the view point 
of market administrators. Partial controllability is not discussed. 
• Market observability as a system: 
The system 
% ( &  +  ! )  =  A ( k ) X ( k )  +  B ( k ) U ( k )  
Y ( k )  =  C ( k ) X ( k )  +  D ( k ) U ( k )  
is observable if for any unknown initial state x 0  there exists a finite k x  > 0 such that the knowledge of 
the input U and the output Y over [0, kx ] suffices to determine uniquely the initial state xQ [Chen, 
1999]. The system is observable if and only if the matrix 
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C 
CA 
CA"' 
has full column rank, where nc is the rank of system matrix C. 
The observability says whether the state variable can be identified from the output. If an electric 
market is observable, the market administrator can know the transition process of the market state 
variables with estimate of input and the market can be monitored closely. GENCOs would have good 
understanding of other GENCOs' output with good estimate of market input. They would want to find 
all available information of other GENCOs to detect decision process of others. 
One interesting and important problem is when the system is not observable, whether some state 
variables (output decisions of some GENCOs) are observable to other GENCOs. This is the problem of 
partial observability. When competitors are observable to a GENCO, it will take advantage of this and 
affect output of its competitors and market price. Consequently, there will be market power problems 
and intervention may become necessary. 
In this work, market observability is studied for the whole market system and from the view point 
of market administrators. Partial controllability is not discussed. 
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3 ELECTRIC MARKET DYNAMICS SIMULATIONS UNDER 
QUANTITY COMPETITION 
Chapter 3 studies electric market dynamics under quantity competition with the effects of different market 
participants' expectations. Quantity competition is studied first because electricity is essential to economy and 
elasticity of demand for electricity is small. GENCOs may have significant influence on price by withholding or 
increasing output while the consumers of electricity are usually price takers. 
3.1 Chapter overview 
In this chapter, Cournot-like quantity competition dynamic models with interactions between GENCOs in 
an oligopolistic electric market are built and used to simulate electric market dynamics. First, different market 
structures and those that are dominant in the electric market are compared and assumptions are summarized. 
Then, the traditional Coumot model is reviewed. A Cournot-like model in which GENCOs are under naive 
expectation is introduced and analyzed in detail. Extended models-GENCOs decision under forward 
expectation, moving average expectation, adaptive expectation, and mixed expectation-are studied, respectively. 
Conclusions for each model are given and numerical examples are provided. Some related issues are discussed 
in the end. 
3.2 Assumptions 
The electric market is changing from a monopolistic market to a competitive market; but the goal has not 
been completely achieved. In a monopolistic market, there is only one producer and consumers are price taker. 
The monopoly sets market price to maximize its own profit and this will lead to undesired loss of social welfare. 
In a perfectly competitive market, both buyer s and sellers assume market price is given and their actions do not 
influence the market price. The total social welfare is maximized in perfectly competitive markets. 
Generally, current electric markets are oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive. Market players in 
current electric market are neither monopolistic because of deregulation nor perfectly competitive because they 
still have some influences on market price. These market structures, as well as other market structures, are 
shown in Figure 3.1 based on the degree of competition in the market. 
This work studies electric market dynamics in oligopolistic market under the following assumptions: 
• There is quantity competition of electricity, a homogeneous product. Electricity buyers either cannot or will 
not distinguish products from different GENCOs; 
• Both GENCO 1 and GENC02 utilize delayed information (market price), estimate of demand and the 
other's output to set output to maximize profit for the coming period. 
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Less Competitive 
More competitive 
Oligopolistic 
Monopolistic 
— Cournot 
Bertrand 
Sweezy 
Stackelberg 
Monopolistically Competitive 
Contestable 
Perfectly Competitive 
Figure 3.1 Different market structures 
• There are two GENCOs: GENCO 1 and GENC02. Both of them have linear generation cost functions: 
c i  ( < ? ,  )  =  c n q i  +  c i 0 , where c, () is generation cost of GENCO i ,  q ,  is generation output of GENCO i, 
cu.cio are constants; 
Such an electric market is shown in Figure 3.2. 
Estimator 1 
GENC01 
Market demand 
P=a-bQ 
P: Price 
Q: total output 
GENCO 2 
Delay 
Delay 
Estimate 
Price 
Estimate 
Price 
Competitors' 
Output 
Output 
Competitors' 
Output 
Output 
Total 
Output 
Price 
Estimator 2 
Figure 3.2 An electric market with two GENCOs under quantity competition 
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3.3 Traditional Cournot model 
The traditional Cournot model describes GENCOs' output under quantity competition [Binger, 1998] 
[Willems, 2000]. Profits of two GENCOs, It, and 712,, are determined by market price p, outputs of two 
GENCOs, qt and q2, and cost coefficients c,, cw> c2i and c20 : 
^1 = PQ1 ~™ Cll9l ~~ CW ; ^2 ~ PQl " C2ll2 ~ C20 
Market price is determined by the inverse demand function: 
P  =  a  — b ( q {  + q 2 )  
In the traditional Cournot model, GENCO i  assumes that its competitor will not change the output decisions 
no matter how much it produces. It can be seen that the following output pair is an equilibrium: 
ti-c, g, a  -  2c, + c, a - c 7  q .  a -  2c, + c, q = L_^2_ = ! 1 q L-2±. = 1 L 
1  2 b  2 3 b  2  2 b  2 3 b  
This equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium, because no GENCO will change its output if the other GENCO 
does not change. However, whether this equilibrium can be reached by two GENCOs is unknown. Conditions 
under which the equilibrium exists should be studied. Moreover, if the equilibrium is finally reached, the 
transition process from the initial state to the equilibrium is of interest. 
The reminder of this chapter extends the traditional Cournot model to study the electric market dynamics 
under quantity competition. Electric market dynamics with consideration of interactions between GENCOs are 
studied and simulated. How to model the market as a control system and apply decision theory for GENCOs are 
demonstrated. The conditions for the existence of equilibrium and market transition processes are simulated. 
Properties of the market equilibrium and market as a control system are obtained. 
3.4 Cournot-like models and market properties studied 
GENCOs should estimate the other's output and make their own output decision based on the estimate. 
GENCO z's profit at time t is 
( f ) = p { t ) q i  { t ) ~  (r)+c0, ] 
=  [ a -  b ( q t  (r) +  q ]  ( ? )  -  [ c u q t  (f) + c0, ] 
=  - b q f { t ) + [ a -  c n q ,  ( t ) ] q ,  ( t ) + b q y A  ( t  ) q t  ( t ) - c i 0  
where (f)i s  GENCO i' s estimate of GENCO j s output at time t. With the first order condition 
d n r , . ( 0 .  
d q t { t )  
GENCO i  should set output as follows to maximize profit: 
= 0, 
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This means under quantity competition GENCOs should only care about the output decision of competitor. 
Therefore, how GENCOs get their estimate becomes important. With estimates obtained by different forecasting 
techniques, GENCOs* output decision and corresponding market dynamics might be different. The following 
expectations and their impact on market dynamics and properties are studied: 
• naïve expectation, 
• forward expectation, 
• moving average expectation, 
• adaptive expectation, 
• and mixed expectation. 
In the following discussions, decision analysis is applied to build decision models for GENCOS. The 
objective is GENCOs' profit for each period. Alternatives available for GENCOs are different output quantities 
within a feasible range. Assume now GENCOs are certain about their expectation (decisions under probabilistic 
expectation are to be discussed in Chapter 4). GENCOs are assumed as risk neutral and its utility can be 
represented solely by profit. 
Different factors that may influence market dynamics have been considered. The time scale is short-term, 
thus no time value of money is concerned. Constraints on decisions are mainly technical: output should be 
between maximum and minimum generation amounts allowed for the generators. 
The following important market properties in equilibrium are calculated: 
• Market share; 
• Market power; 
• Market controllability ; 
• Market observability. 
3.4.1 Cournot-like model: two GENCOs under naïve expectation 
Under naïve expectation, GENCO i believes that GENCO j will not change its output: 
Therefore, at time t GENCO i will set its output as 
GENCO i needs to choose output q,*(t) from a feasible range [qmin> qmax] to maximize profit. 
To model the electric market, choose ^and^^as state variables and the market price as the output. 
Then, the market system can be represented by the following 2nd-order system: 
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q x { t + 1 ) "  
92^  +  0 .  
0 r 
2 r*wi + 
a - c u  
2 b  
1 0 a - c n  
L 2 L 2 b  J 
<h(t) 
( t )  q2 
+ CL • 
The stability and other control system properties can be derived from this system state space equation. The 
condition for existence of the equilibrium is the eigenvalues of system "A" matrix are all within the unit circle. If 
both GENCOs have linear cost function, the system is always stable (with eigenvalues±o.5). Otherwise, the 
eigenvalues must be computed. 
It can be seen that the market under naïve expectation and traditional Cournot model have the same 
equilibrium when it exists. The traditional Cournot model can be seen as a special case of both GENCOs under 
naïve expectation. 
It is assumed that GENCOs know the inverse demand function. When GENCO 1 and GENC02 do not know 
the actual demand function, they must estimate the demand. Assume that GENCO i's estimate of the demand is 
p = a, — bfQ , i =1,2. Then, the system becomes 
0 
1 
f 
w 
>(r). 
a, - c n  
(' + !)" 
q2 (f +1) 
= 2 
0 
+ 
2 bt 
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 t 
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It is also assumed cost functions of GENCOs are linear. When GENCO i's production cost function is 
quadratic, c,. {qt ) = ci2qf + cnqt + ci0 ,and GENCOs have different estimate of demand , the market 
becomes 
0 a, cM ?,(r + l) 2 [bx +c21) 9,W 2{bx +c21) 
q2 (t +1) b2 0 32 ('). a2 — c, 2 
2{b2 + c22 ) l{b2+c22) 
'P(t)=[-b-b ( 92W +  a  
In later discussion, nonlinear cost functions are not discussed and models with them can be built similarly. 
To see the impact of different system parameters on market properties and dynamics, in each of the 
following case study and later studies, the following parameters are set values different from those in base case: 
market demand properties, GENCOs' generation production cost, and GENCOs' expectation parameters. 
Corresponding market performances and properties are then obtained by simulation and analyzed. 
A two-GENCO market in which GENCOs are under naïve expectation are simulated (assume GENCOs 
know inverse demand function). GENCOs parameters and market system properties are shown in Table 3.1 and 
parameter with value different from the base case are highlighted. The following conclusions can be obtained: 
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Table 3.1 Market properties when GENCOs are under naïve expectation 
Parameters 
Case base 1 2 3 
a 6 7 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
cn 3 3 4 2 
C21 3 3 3 3 
Stable? Yes yes yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
11 10 6.667 3.333 16.667 
<72 10 6.667 13.333 6.667 
Q 20 13.333 16.667 23.333 
Price 4 4.333 4.333 3.667 
Market properties 
MPJ,MP2 0.333, 0.333 0.444,0.444 0.083,0.444 0.833, 0.222 
MSi,MS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.2,0.8 0.714,0.286 
Market system properties 
Controllability Not controllable 
Observability Not observable 
• Under naïve expectation, price/quantity equilibrium, market share, and market power depend on all 
system parameters except fixed generation cost ci0 . c,0 does not affect market stability and equilibrium 
(ci0 is not shown in Table 3.1); 
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) may give GENCOs more market power; 
b 
• A lower marginal cost leads to higher market share and more market power; 
• Under naive expectation, market system is always stable; 
• Under naive expectation, market is always uncontrollable and unobservable. Market administrators 
can't affect market output through input. GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output. 
Price dynamics in Table 3.1 are shown in Figure 3.3. It can be seen that system parameters do have effects 
on transition processes. In call cases, market prices reach equilibrium but price transitions and settle down times 
(defined as the time price needs to converge to equilibrium) are different. These dynamic processes should be 
evaluated by ICA to decide whether intervention is necessary (for example, whether price is beyond a proper 
range) and how to find schemes to adjust these properties. 
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Figure 3.3 Price dynamics when GENCOs are under naïve expectation 
3.4.2 Cournot-like model: two GENCOs under forward expectation 
Assume both GENCOs adopt forward expectations, which means each GENCO adjusts expectation of the 
other's output according to the other's output history and possible final equilibrium. To be specific, GENCO i 
believes its competitor will gradually converge to a final equilibrium: 
q j { t )  =  q j ( t - \ )  +  X j [ q ] - q j ( t - 1 ) ]  =  X f i ]  +  ( 1  -  X j  ) q ,  ( t  - 1 )  
where Xj is the adjustment coefficient for GENCO j, q. is the possible output equilibrium of GENCO j. 
Forward expectation is valid when GENCOs anticipate a future equilibrium for competitors. GENCOs 
believe competitors try to gradually reach specific equilibrium because of certain constraints and won't move 
away from the equilibrium due to the risk associated with actions significantly deviating from that equilibrium. 
Under forward expectation, GENCO i sets its output as 
4,(0 = a-Cn 
2 b  
1 — A: X. , 
^-9,0-1)-^,. 
It needs to choose output qt*(t) from a feasible range [qmin, q^] to maximize profit. 
To model the market, choose qx (t) and q2(t) as state variables and market price as the output. The market 
can then be represented by the following 2nd-order system: 
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Stability and other properties can be derived from this state space equation. For example, "A" matrix of the 
-IzAl 
2 system is 
0 
.IzA 
2 
0 
and eigenvalues of the A matrix are + 
A two-GENCO market in which both GENCOs are under forward expectations is simulated. Different 
GENCOs' parameters and market dynamic properties are shown in Table 3.2. Parameters with values different 
from those in base case are highlighted. The following conclusions can be obtained: 
• Price/quantity equilibrium, market share and market power depend on all system parameters except c,0 ; 
c,o does not influence market stability and equilibrium(not shown in Table 3.2); 
• Changes in affect equilibrium price/quantity; 
a  
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) may give GENCOs more market power; 
b 
• A lower marginal cost of GENCO leads to higher market share and more market power; 
• System is always uncontrollable and unobservable. Market administrators can not affect market output 
through input. GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output; 
Table 3.2 Market properties when GENCOs are under forward expectation 
Parameters 
Case base 1 2 3 
a 6 7 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Cll 3 3 3 2 
X, 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 
C21 3 3 3 3 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
Qi 10 6.667 10 16.162 
<72 10 6.667 10 11.717 
Q 20 13.333 20 27.879 
Price 4 4.333 4 3.212 
Market properties 
MPhMP2 0.333, 0.333 0.444, 0.444 0.333,0.333 0.606, 0.071 
MS,,MS2 0.5, 0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.580,0.420 
Market system properties 
Controllability Not controllable 
Observability Not observable 
26 
System output (price) dynamics in all cases are shown in Figure 3.4. It can be seen that with different 
expectations parameters, market has different transition processes. Moreover, they are different from those 
under naïve expectation in Figure 3.3, even when the market demand is the same. 
case 1 
case 2 
base case 
case 3 
Figure 3.4 Price dynamics when GENCOs are under forward expectation 
3.4.3 Cournot-like model: two GENCOs under adaptive expectation 
A smart GENCO learns from history to improve quality of the future expectation. Adaptive expectation is a 
good technique for GENCOs to learn from the past and make better decisions. It has been proved to be one of 
the most effective forecasting techniques [Sterman, 2000] [Makridakis, 1984]. Under adaptive expectation, 
GENCOs adjust output expectation of competitors according to the competitor's output and the forecasting error 
in the last period. To be more specific, when GENCO i adopts adaptive expectation, its expectation is 
q,(0 -Qj(t -1) = Pj(qj(t-1)-qj(t -1)) or q.(t) = q.(f -1) + p.(q.( z -1 ) -q](t -1)) 
where {j. is the adjusting coefficient for GENCO i. 
Under adaptive expectation, according to the first order condition, optimal output for GENCO i is 
GENCO i needs to choose output qt*(t) from a feasible range [qmm qmax] to maximize profit. 
Now choose qx (t) , q2 (t) , q] (f) and q2 (t) as the state variables and market price as the output. The market 
can be represented by the following 4th-order system: 
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A two-GENCO market in which both GENCOs adopt adaptive expectations is studied. GENCOs 
parameters and market dynamic properties are shown in Table 3.3. Parameters with values different from those 
in the base case are highlighted. The following conclusions can be obtained: 
• Market price/quantity equilibrium, if any, together with market share and market power depend on all 
parameters except ci0 (not shown in Table 3.3); c,g does not affect market stability and equilibrium; 
• Expectation parameter affects system stability; 
a 
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) may give GENCOs more market power;. 
b 
• A lower marginal cost of GENCO leads to higher market share and more market power; 
• System is always uncontrollable and unobservable. 
Table 3.3 Market properties when GENCOs are under adaptive expectation 
Parameters 
Case base 1 2 3 4 
a 6 7 6 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Cu 3 3 2 3 3 
Pi 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.3 
C21 3 3 3 3 3 
A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.4 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes No 
Equilibrium pro) oerties 
9; 10 6.667 16.667 10 -
92 10 6.667 16.667 10 -Q 20 13.333 33.333 20 -
Price 4 4.333 3.667 4 -
Market properties 
mp,,mp2 0.333,0.33 
3 
0.444,0.444 0.833,0.222 0.333,0.333 
-
ms,,ms2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.714,0.286 0.5,0.5 -
Market system properties 
Controllability Not controllable 
Observability Not observable 
Market price dynamics in all cases are shown in Figure 3.5. It can be seen that under different adaptive 
expectations, prices have different transition processes and these transitions are different from those under other 
expectations. The most distinguished difference is stability problem exists in transition process under adaptive 
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expectation. In case 4 in Figure 3.5, there is no market equilibrium and intervention from market administration 
may be necessary if market price is out of a proper range or doesn't converge at all. 
7 
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Figure 3.5 Price dynamics when GENCOs are under adaptive expectation 
3.4.4 Cournot-like model: two GENCOs under moving average expectation 
Moving average, like adaptive expectation, uses historical data in the past few periods to estimate new data. 
Under moving average expectation, each data in the past is assigned a weight to reflect ability in forecasting. 
Assume GENCO 1 uses GENC02's output in the past two periods, qrft-1) and q2(t-2), to forecast q2(t). The 
weights are 0 < W [ k  < 1,  k = 1,2,^ W l k  = 1. So, expected output of GENC02 at time t  is 
A 2 
(*) = ]£ wWzff-*) 
6=1 
Under weighted average expectation, GENCO I's output will be 
GENCO i  needs to choose output q,*(t)  from a feasible range [qm n ,  qm a x]  to maximize profit. 
Similarly assume GENC02 also uses GENCOl's output in past two periods to forecast. The weights 
are 0 < w2m < 1, m = 1, 2, w2m = 1. Then, the expected output of GENCO 1 at time t is 
A 2 
9i(')=Z w2mqx{t-m) 
GENC02's output would be 
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To model the market, chooseq} (t), <?,(f -1), q2(t) and q2(t-1) as state variables and the price as system 
output. The market can be represented by the following 4th-order system: 
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Properties of market as a control system can be obtained with the system state space equation. 
A two-GENCO market in which both GENCOs adopt a weighted moving average expectation is studied. 
GENCO parameters and corresponding market dynamic properties are shown in Table 3.4. Parameters with 
values different from those in the base case are highlighted. 
Table 3.4 Market properties when GENCOs are under moving average expectation 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 
a 6 7 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Cll 3 3 2 3 
yu. w/2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.2,0.8 
Cll 3 3 3 3 
W21, W22 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
1i 10 6.667 10 6.667 
<72 10 6.667 5 6.667 
Q 20 13.333 15 13.333 
Price 4 4.333 4 4.333 
Market properties 
MPhMPi 0.333,0.333 0.444,0.444 1,0.333 0.444,0.44 
4 
MS i,MS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.667,0.33 
3 
0.5,0.5 
Market system properties 
Controllability Not controllable 
Observability Not observable 
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The following conclusions can be obtained: 
• Under moving average expectation, market price/quantity equilibrium, if any, together with market 
share and market power depend on all system parameters except ci0 . cl0 does not influence market 
stability and equilibrium (c,0 is not shown in Table 3.4); 
a  
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) may give GENCOs more market power. 
b  
• A lower marginal cost of GENCO leads to higher market share and more market power. 
• System is always uncontrollable and unobservable. 
System output (price) dynamics are shown in Figure 3.6. It can be seen that with different moving average 
expectations, market dynamics are different. Those transitions are also different from those under other 
expectations, even when the demand is the same. 
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Figure 3.6 Price dynamics when GENCOs are under moving average expectation 
From control system point of view, moving average expectation with fixed weight can be seen as naïve 
expectation with a filter and the system output should be less dynamic than under naïve expectation. This can be 
verified by curves in Figure 3.7. With the same market parameters, generation costs, and initial values, the 
overshoot of dynamics under moving average is less. 
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Figure 3.7 Price dynamics under moving average expectation and naïve expectation 
When GENCOs use data from more than two periods in estimating, market system can still be modeled as a 
control system. Assume that GENCO 1 uses output of GENC02 in the past K2 periods to forecast q2(t). That is 
Kl 
42 M =1] w 2 k q { t - k )  
k=1 
Then, 
9 , i ( f+ i )=  a ,  - c ,  1 sr , W2k(lit-k) 
^ lc= 0 26, . 
Assume that GENC02 does the same thing but using data from the past AT; periods. 
To model the market as a control system, state variables are chosen as follows 
?i(0> —, qx{t-Kx +1) q2(t),q2(t-l),...,q2{t-K2 +l) 
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3.4.5 Cournot-like model: two GENCOs under different expectations 
In previous section, both GENCOs are assumed to adopt same expectation. When GENCO 1 and GENC02 
have different expectations, market system can still be modeled as a control system. The market system under 
three different expectation combinations-naïve/forward expectation, forward/adaptive expectation, and 
adaptive/moving average (2 Points) expectation-are studied below as examples. Other combinations of 
expectations can be analyzed similarly. 
3.4.5.1 Naïve expectation and forward expectation 
Assume GENCOl uses naïve expectation and GENC02 uses forward expectation. Choose q x ( t ) and q 2 ( t )  
as state variables and market price as the output. The market can then be represented by the following 2nd-order 
system: 
q^t + i) 
_q2{t + l) 
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I — A 
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9i ( f )  
q2 (0 
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2b 
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- T « ,  
3.4.5.2 Forward expectation and adaptive expectation 
Assume GENCOl uses forward expectation and GENC02 uses adaptive expectation. Choose qx (r), ?| (;) 
and q2(t)&s state variables and market price as the output. The market can then be represented by following 3rd-
order system: 
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3.4.5.3 Adaptive expectation and moving average (2 points) expectation. 
Assume GENCOl uses adaptive expectation and GENC02 uses moving average (2 points) expectation. 
Choose qx (t), qx (t -1), q2 (t) and ç, (t) as state variables and market price as the output. The market can then 
be represented by the following 4th-order system: 
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3.5 An example of market control scheme design— introduction of demand-met-error feedback 
How to model GENCOs decisions, interactions between GENCOs, and electric market dynamics using 
systems theory have been demonstrated. With these models, the electric market dynamics can be simulated. One 
important advantage of these control models is they can help design market property control scheme using 
techniques and conclusions in systems theory. This section gives an example of market control scheme design by 
introducing a demand-error-met feedback signal into the market. 
In previous models, GENCOs only know market price to forecast competitors' actions and make decisions. 
ICA could provide other market information to GENCOs to get different market performance. An example of 
such information is demand-met-error. Although the electric market is always clear, which means all electricity 
generated is consumed, sometimes the demand for electricity is not fully met (thus some load may be shed) and 
sometimes there is a supply surplus (which may lead to a price too low). This happens when there is a demand 
forecast error by ICA or GENCOs. ICA may provide GENCOs demand-met-error that means how much demand 
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was not met or how much supply surplus existed in the last period. From viewpoint of systems theory, this can 
be seen as introducing a feedback signal into the system. Such a market scheme is shown in Figure 3.8. 
Assume GENCOl believes GENC02 adjusts output according to the demand-met-error u(t)  by a coefficient 
CX2  based on its output in the last period. That is, q2  {t  + l) = q2  (?)+ C(2u{t).  Then, GENCOl sets its own 
output as 
+ 0= ~~2^2^—2""^ 
Assume that GENC02 has similar expectation. 
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Figure 3.8 An electric market under quantity competition with demand-met-error feedback 
To model decisions of GENCOs and market, choose g, (f)andg2 (f) as state variables and market price as 
the output. The market can then be represented by the following 2nd-order system: 
9 i ( r+ l ) "  
<? 2 ( î+ l )  
0 --
2 
-- 0 
. 2 
9, M 
.h W 
p{t) = [-b -b\ 9i(f) 
q2it)_ 
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a, 
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u(t) + 
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2b 
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In this model the demand-met-error, u(t) ,  can be seen as the control variable from ICA. It represents the 
influence of ICA on market participants and market performance. 
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A two-GENCO market in which ICA provides demand-met-error feedback is studied. GENCOs parameters 
and corresponding market dynamic properties are shown in Table 3.5. Parameters with values different from 
those in base case are highlighted. Load levels for all cases are set as 25. Following observation can be made: 
• Under new market scheme, price/quantity equilibrium, market share, and market power depend on all 
system parameters except the fixed generation cost ci0 . ci0 does not influence market stability and 
equilibrium (c,0 is not shown in Table 3.5); 
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) may give GENCOs more market power; 
b 
• A lower marginal cost leads to higher market share and more market power; 
• The market system is always stable; 
• If expectation parameters of two GENCOs are different, the market is controllable. Market 
administrators can change market output through input. However, the market is unobservable. 
GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output. 
Table 3.5 Properties of market with demand-met-error feedback 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 4 
a 6 7 6 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Cll 3 3 2 3 3 
cc2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 1 
Cu 3 3 3 3 3 
ax 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
Qi 8.75 3.75 16.250 6.765 10.625 
QI 8.75 3.75 6.25 9.412 8.125 
Q 17.5 7.5 22.5 16.177 18.75 
Price 4.25 5.5 3.75 4.382 4.125 
Market properties 
MP,,MP2 0.417,0.417 0.833,0.83 
3 
0.875,0.125 0.461,0.461 0.375,0.375 
MS j,MS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.722,0.278 0.418,0.582 0.567,0.433 
Market system properties 
Controllability Not controllable Controllable 
Observability Not observable 
Price dynamics in all cases are shown in Figure 3.9. It can be seen that price dynamics with demand-met-
error feedback is less dynamic than those without feedback (such as dynamics under naïve expectation): both 
overshoot and settle down time are much less. This is because generally introduction of feedback signals 
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improve system performances, such as a quicker dynamic response. By choosing parameters in feedback process 
properly, desired system dynamics may be achieved. 
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Figure 3.9 Price dynamics under quantity competition with demand-met-error 
3.6 Chapter summary and discussions 
In this chapter, electric market is modeled as a control system and systems theory is applied to study market 
properties. Market dynamics under different GENCOs' expectations have been simulated. With system state 
space equations, market properties, such as stability, equilibriums, and transition process, are obtained. 
Simulation results show different expectations, either different types of expectations or same type of 
expectation with different parameters, lead to different GENCO s decisions and market performance. It happens 
even though the market has same demand and GENCOs have same production cost. This can be verified by 
comparing simulation examples in this chapter, in which GENCOs production cost and market characteristics 
are the same while expectations are different. Moreover, under some expectations (such as adaptive 
expectation) with inaccurate parameters, GENCOs' legitimate decisions to maximize profit without violating 
market rules can results in highly volatile or extremely high market prices. Market administrators should keep 
these in mind in market design and market monitoring to prevent possible problems and solve existing problems. 
Expectations of GENCOs can be changed by introducing changes in market rules and organizations, such as 
introducing of demand-met-error feedback. 
Simulation results also show under different expectations, market properties and transition processes may 
be very different. The following conclusions are obtained: 
• Interactions between GENCOs are important to GENCO decisions and market performance. 
• Price/quantity equilibrium, market share, and market power depend on all system parameters except the 
fixed generation cost cm ; cl0 does not influence market stability and equilibrium ; 
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• Different degrees of demand elasticity give GENCOs different .market power. A more inelastic demand 
a (with less — ) may give GENCOs more market power. Therefore, demand (load) management to adjust 
b  
demand properties could be a way to decrease market power; 
• A lower marginal cost of a GENCO leads to higher market share and more market power; 
• Under some expectations with inaccurate parameters, GENCOs' legitimate decisions to maximize 
profit without violating market rules can lead to highly volatile or extremely high market prices. 
Intervention from market administrators then become necessary 
• In cases in market under quantity competition with only price information feedback, the market is 
neither controllable nor observable. When a demand-met-error is introduced, the market becomes 
controllable but unobservable. This means market administrators may change market output through 
input but GENCOs' output can't be observed from market output since the market is unobservable. 
Demand-met-error has been introduced into market model as a feedback to demonstrate market property 
control scheme. Other market control scheme can be designed similarly. Examples of other control scheme 
include: introduction of price cap or price floor (which can be seen as saturation process); limitation on 
maximum market share of market participants; control of publicly accessible information, such as price and 
outputs of market participants; adjustment of transaction cost in trading; load management to adjust demand 
elasticity. Quantitative analysis is needed to tune parameters to achieve desired market properties. 
Simulation models developed in this chapter are for the day ahead market, in which GENCOs submit bids 
every day and adjust bids the next day. With proper modifications (to change time setting and apply different 
demand characteristics and technical constraints, etc.), this method can also be tailored to study other short-term 
electric market, such as real time market. Physical power systems control with effects from market can then be 
studied. [Kumar, 1997a], [Kumar, 1997b], and [Donde, 2001] have built AGC (Automatic Generation Control) 
models in new deregulated environment and simulated power system controls with impact of GENCOs' and 
DISTCOs' actions. Models in [Kumar, 1997a], [Kumar, 1997b], and [Donde, 2001] can be incorporated into 
models developed in this chapter to simulate market system with impact from power system control. 
In this chapter, only one dynamic process cycle for each market system model is simulated. The result is 
that after several periods of interaction between GENCOs, market evolves and may reach certain steady state. 
Dynamics of more than one cycle can be simulated by applying changes in market, such as production cost 
change in GENCOs, or change of GENCOs' expectation parameters because of new information. The market 
will then begin a new dynamics cycle starting from current status and evolve again, as seen in practical cyclic 
markets. 
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4 ELECTRIC MARKET DYNAMICS SIMULATION UNDER 
QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH UNCERTAINTY 
4.1 Chapter overview 
The electric market, like other markets, is full of uncertainty. GENCOs should evaluate risk in each 
possible future scenario to make better decisions. This chapter studies how GENCO should make decisions 
under quantity competition with uncertainty. Two sources of uncertainty are considered. One is information 
delay. The other one is GENCO forecasting and estimation. GENCO decisions with uncertainty from these 
sources are discussed, respectively, and electric market dynamics are simulated. 
4.2 Information delay 
Market information delay generates uncertainty. When GENCOs make decisions, they cannot know current 
decisions of competitors and market price. What they know is historical GENCOs' output and market prices. To 
make decisions based on past market information, GENCO must consider the possibility that other's decisions 
and market price may deviate from their past track. Depending on how long the information is delayed, 
uncertainty can be grouped into uncertainty from one period delay and that from more than one period delay. 
4.2.1 One period information delay 
Uncertainty from one period information delay exists when GENCO could know market information from 
the last period. GENCO can estimate the competitor's output based on 
where <j)i Q is probabilistic expectation function for GENCO i to estimate output of GENCO j. 
Effect of this delay has been automatically included in the discrete system model. 
X { t )  =  A ( t  - 1  ) X ( t  - 1 )  +  B ( t  - 1  ) U ( t  - 1 )  
Y ( t )  =  C ( t  - 1  ) X ( t  - 1 )  +  D ( t  - 1  ) U ( t  - 1 )  
where decisions for time t+1 are based on information available at time t. 
4.2.2 Information delay of more than one period 
Information delay of more than one period may exist. This happens when GENCOs can only know market 
information several periods before the current period and they need to make decisions for current period. Then, 
GENCO may estimate the competitor's output based on information from past: 
q] (0 = # (g, (f - m), qj (it-m-1 qj (it-m-n)) 
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where </>i Q is the expectation function for GENCO i to estimate output of GENCO j, m is the information 
delayed time and m+n is the time length when market information is available. 
One example of the expectation function for information delay of more than one period is 
m+n 
<fi (9, {t ~ m\<7, (it ~ m - l),...,gy {t - m - n)) = ptq} (t -1) 
where pt is the probability that the output at time I would beqj{t — l). It can be seen that the estimate 
becomes moving average expectations with weight for each past output set as its probability. 
In later discussion, only expectation using the last period information is modeled. Decisions with 
information available for time periods other than the last period can be studied similarly. 
4.3 GENCO decisions with uncertain estimate 
4.3.1 GENCO decisions with uncertain estimate of competitor 
To model uncertainty with estimate for the competitor's actions, one convenient and effective way is to 
discret!se probabilistic distribution of the estimate. Suppose each GENCO believes its competitor will set output 
as a linear function of output in the last period. With k =1, 2, ...K possible scenarios, GENCO i forecasts 
GENCO j will set output to yik q/t-1) at time t with probability pik, where q/t-1) is GENCO j's output at time 
t-1. The underlying reason for this is competitor's output cannot deviate from q/t-1) freely due to technical and 
financial constraints. An example of K=3 is shown in Table 4.1. Assume GENCO i also has its own estimate of 
the market demand as p = g. - btQ, which is different from the true demand. 
Table 4.1 Estimate of competitor's outputs by GENCO i (K=3) 
Case Output of GENCO j at time t Probability 
1 
ïnqjO-D Pn 
2 Pa 
3 
7,3 Qj (l'l> Pi3  
The market with GENCOs probabilistic estimate of competitor's output is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Now GENCO can explicitly apply decision analysis. The decision tree for GENCO i at time t is shown in 
Figure 4.2. GENCO i needs to choose output q,*(t) from a feasible range [qmln, qmax] to maximize the expected 
profit (GENCOs are assumed risk neutral). 
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Figure 4.1 An electric market with GENCOs with probabilistic estimate of competitor 
GENCO i's expected profit is 
E(X;(t)) = Y ,P'^ik 
The profit for GENCO i in case k is 
x,k (0 = pk (')<?, (t)-cnqi (0 -cl0 = [at -bt (qjk (t)+ q, (/))]<?, (t)-caqi (t)-ciQ 
Therefore, 
£(*(*)) = ~(*) ~ 
To maximize the expected profit, 
(«, -c,i) 
2b, 2 
To model the market, choose ^^^and^z W as state variables and market price as the output. The market 
can be represented by the following 2nd-order system: 
41 
Figure 4.2 GENCO decision tree with probabilistic estimate of competitor's output 
9i(' + l) 
q2 C + 1). 
0 
Pu YU 
p\ky\k 
p{t) = [-b -b] 9,(0 
q2(t)_ 
?i(0 
q2(t\ 
+ a 
2 bx 
2b, 
Properties of market as a control system can be obtained with these state space equations. 
A two-GENCO market in which GENCOs have probabilistic estimate of other's outputs are simulated. 
Parameters of GENCOs and corresponding market dynamic properties are shown in Table 4.2. Parameters with 
values different from those in base case are highlighted. To simplify discussion, parameters of GENC02 are set 
same for all cases and summarized: cost function parameters c2I = 3.0, c20 = 2.0; estimate of demand a2 = 6, b2 
= 0.1; estimate of GENCOl action is 0.8qi(t-l) with probability 0.1, 1.0qi(t-l) with probability 0.8 and \.2qt(t-
1) with probability 0.1. The following inferences can be drawn: 
• Equilibrium, if any, depends on all system parameters (generation cost, demand properties, etc.) except 
c,o ; ci0 does not change market stability and equilibrium (not shown in Table 4.2); 
• A lower marginal cost leads to higher market share and more market power. 
• The market is always uncontrollable and unobservable. Market administrators can not influence the 
market output through input. GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output. 
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Table 4.2 Market properties when GENCOs are under probabilistic estimate 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 4 
a 6 7 6 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
ai, bi 6, 0.1 6,0.1 6,01 6, 0.1 6,0.1 
CLL 3 3 2 3 3 
Yw @ Pu 0.8@0.1 0.8@0.1 0.8 @0.1 0.7@0.2 0.9@0.05 
Zi2 @ Pn 1.000.8 1.0@0.8 1.0@0.8 1.0 @0.7 1.0@0.8 
7l3 @ P\1 1.2@0.1 1.2@0.1 1.2@0.1 1.3@0.1 1.2@0.15 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
Q L 10 10 16.667 10.198 9.832 
<72 10 10 6.667 9.901 10.084 
Q 20 20 23.333 20.09 19.916 
Price 4 3 3.667 3.99 4.008 
Market properties 
MPUMP2 0.333,0.333 0,0 0.833,0.222 0.33,0.33 0.336,0.336 
MS,,MS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.714,0.286 0.507,0.493 0.494,0.506 
Market system properties 
Controllability Uncontrollable 
Observability Unobservable 
System output (price) dynamics in all cases are shown in Figure 4.3. It can be seen that with probabilistic 
estimate, price transitions are different from those under certainty. With fixed probabilistic estimate, the market 
has less dynamic transitions. This is because fixed probabilistic expectation uses historical price in more than 
one period to predict future price and this equals to add a low-pass filter in price signal feedback channel. 
7 
6 
case 3 5 
base case, case 4 
o. 4 case 2 
case 1 3 
2 
1 
4 0 2 6 8 10 14 12 
time 
Figure 4.3 Price dynamics when GENCOs have probabilistic estimate 
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4.3.2 GENCO decisions with uncertain forecasting techniques 
A smart GENCO may use different forecasting techniques in case sometimes one technique is not accurate. 
Each technique is assigned to different degrees of certainty to reflect its capability to predict. 
Assume now GENCO 1 uses adaptive expectation and forward expectation at the same time. GENCOl 
believes these methods have different forecasting abilities and wants the final result to be a weighted average of 
them. Suppose the weight assigned to adaptive expectation is (Ù and to forward expectation is 1-<M, where 
0 < fiJ < 1. Assume GENC02 uses adaptive expectation only. 
So, GENCOl expects GENC02's output at time t is 
q 2 ( t )  =  { t  -  V )  +  { \  -  f i ) q 2 { t  - 1 ) ]  +  ( 1  -  û ) ) [ À q 2  +  ( 1  - À ) q 2 ( t  - 1 ) ]  
= lco/3 + (1 -  œ ) { \  -  À  ) ] q 2  (r-l) + û*l-/?)92(r-l) + (l-œ ) À q 2 '  
Where q 2 ( t  —  l ) is the expected output of GENC02 using adaptive expectation, q 2  is the possible final steady 
state of GENC02's output in forward expectation. 
To make the case more realistic, assume GENCOl has a probabilistic estimation of demand. It believes 
demand parameters are a/k and bik with probability pjk, k =1,2,...,K. The estimate of the market demand 
function is p = aik — bikQ A case of K=3 is shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 GENCOl's estimate of demand (K=3) 
Case Estimation of demand parameters Probability 
1 au, bu Pu 
2 o12, b/2 Pn 
3 a is, bi3 Pl3 
With above estimate, GENCOl tries to maximize its expected profit 
E(nx(t)) = Y JPnXik • 
k  
The decision tree for GENCOl at time t is shown in Figure 4.4. 
In case k, profit of GENCOl is 
X l k ( t )  =  P k  ( O î .  ( t )-cn q x { t )-cw =  [ a l k  ~ b i k ( q 2  ( f ) +  q l ( t ) ) ] q l ( t )-cn q l ( t )-c l0  
The total expected profit of GENCOl is 
E{k x (r)) = 2X^1* ( t )  =  ( £ p nau — c l l ) q l ( t )  —  q f  (0^ "C10 
k  k  k  k  
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1 -CD 
q*(t) 
[max 
I-CO 
Figure 4.4 Decision tree for GENCOl using two methods under uncertainty at time t 
So, 
2^ A At 2 
From the conclusion in section 3.5.3, we have 
To model the market system, choose q x ( t ) , q 2 ( t ) , q x ( t ) ,  and q 2 ( t )  as state variables and market price as 
the output. The market can then be represented by the following 4th-order system: 
% qx(t+V) 0 0 ffl#+(l-<a)(l -A) <h(t) 
* 2 2 A 
A i-A 0 0 9, to 
q2{t+\) 
_£ i-A 0 0 %to A 2 2 A 
%(f+l) 0 0 ##+(!-<#- 2) ®(i-A) „ 
2 
0 
~~
C21 
lb, 
(\-CÛ)Àq2 
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p(t) = \-b 0 —b 0 
?i(0 
4i(0 
92 W 
92 (0 
+ a 
A market system with two GENCOs using different expectation models is simulated. Table 4.4 shows 
different parameters for the market. GENCOl uses forward and adaptive expectations at the same time with a 
different certainty while GENC02 adopts forward expectation. Parameters with values different from those in 
the base case are highlighted. Parameters of GENC02 are set as the same for all cases and summarized here: 
cost function parameters are c2I = 3.0, c2o = 2.0; the estimation of demand is a2 = 6, b2 = 0.1; GENC02's 
Estimation of GENCOl is the adaptive expectation with beta = 0.8. q,* = 10; 
Table 4.4 Market properties when GENCOs have two expectations 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 4 
a 6 7 6 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
a,, b, 6,0.1 6,0.1 6,0.1 6,0.1 6,0.1 
C/7 3 3 2 3 3 
m 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 
fi 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 
X 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 
Stable? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
Qi 11.132 11.132 17.447 10.676 12.917 
<72 9.284 9.284 6.126 9.512 8.331 
Q 20.416 20.416 23.573 20.188 21.248 
Price 3.958 2.917 3.643 3.981 3.875 
Market properties 
MPuMPi 0,319,0.319 -0.028,-0.028 0.821,0.214 0.327,0327 0.292,0.292 
ms,,ms2 0.545,0.455 0.545,0.455 0.74,0.26 0529,0.471 0.608,0.392 
Market system properties 
Controllability Uncontrollable 
Observability Unobservable 
The following observations can be made: 
• Price/quantity equilibrium, if any, market power and market share depend on all system parameters c i0:  
ci0, does not influence market stability and equilibrium(not shown in Table 4.4); 
• A lower marginal cost leads to higher market share and more market power. 
• The market is always uncontrollable and unobservable. Market administrators can not influence the 
market output through input. GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output. 
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System output (price) dynamics in all cases are shown in Figure 4.5. It can be seen with different GENCO 
expectations parameters, market dynamics are different. Moreover, transition processes in Figure 4.5 are 
generally even less dynamic. This is because using weighted average of estimate results from two techniques 
equals to addition of a low-pass filter in the price feedback channel. 
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Figure 4.5 Price dynamics when GENCO use two methods under uncertainty 
4.3.3 GENCO decisions with uncertain response to demand-met-error feedback 
When there is demand-met-error feedback, how competitors respond to it may be uncertain to GENCOs. In 
this situation, GENCOs could discretise probabilistic distribution of competitors' responses and then make their 
optimal output decision. Such a market is shown in Figure 4.6. 
Suppose GENCOl believes GENC02 adjusts output based on demand-met-error by an coefficient Of, with 
probability P2i in two cases, which are listed in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 GENCOl s estimate of competitors' response to demand-met-error 
Case <?2 (r + l) Probability 
1 q 2 { t ) + a 2 1 u { t )  P21 
2 q 2 ( t ) + a 2 2 u { t )  P 2 2  
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Figure 4.6 An electric market with probabilistic estimate of other's response to demand-met-error 
Assume that GENC02 has a similar estimate - two cases with two different probabilities. 
To model the market system, choose qx (t), q2 (t) as state variables and the market price as output. The 
market can then be represented by the following 2nd-order system: 
4i(r + l) 
q 2 ( t + l )  
0 -
2 
0 
9,(f) 
Hi (0. 
y ,^2ka2k a i  ~ c i  
+ 2 
^jP\ka\k 
u ( t )  +  2b, 
a 2  ~ c 2  
L 2 J 1 « 
p(t) = [-b -b] 9i (0 
q2 (0. 
+ a 
A market system with two GENCOs using probabilistic expectation on the other's response to demand-met-
error is simulated. Table 4.6 shows different parameters for two GENCOs and market properties. Parameters 
with values different from those in the base case are highlighted. Parameters of GENC02 are set as the same for 
all cases and summarized: cost function parameters are c2/ = 3.0, c2o = 2.0; estimate of demand is a2 = 6, b2 = 
0.1; estimate of GENCOl action is QA*w+qt(t-l) with probability 0.4, 0.6*u+qi(t-l) with probability 0.6. In 
all cases load level is set as 25; 
The following observations can be made: 
• Price/quantity equilibrium, market power, and market share depend on all system parameters except ci0 
; ci0 does not influence market stability and equilibrium(not shown in Table 4.6); 
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Table 4.6 Market properties with probabilistic estimate of other's response to demand-met-error 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 
a 6 7 6 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
at, bi 6,0.1 6,0.1 6,01 6,0.1 
Cu 3 3 2 3 
au @ Pu 0.8@0.2 0.800.2 0.8@0.2 0.8@0.4 
au @ Pn 0.6@0.8 0.6@0.8 0.6@0.8 0.5@0.6 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes 
et, luilibrium properties 
Qi 7.935 7.935 15.978 8.065 
Q 2 8.913 8.913 6.304 8.871 
q 16.848 16.848 22.28 16.94 
Price 4.315 3.63 3.772 4.306 
Market properties 
MPj,MP2 0.438,0.438 0.21,0.21 0.886,0.257 0.435,0.435 
ms,,ms2 0.471,0.529 0.471,0.529 0.717,0.283 0.476,0.524 
Market system properties 
Controllability Controllable 
Observability Not observable 
• A lower marginal cost leads to higher market share and more market power. 
• If two GENCOs have different estimate of the other's response to demand-met-error, as seen in all 
cases, the market are controllable. Market administrators can change market output through input. If 
two GENCOs have same estimate of the other's response to demand-met-error, the market is 
uncontrollable. 
• The market is always unobservable. GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output. 
System output (price) dynamics in all stable cases are shown in Figure 4.7. It can be seen that with different 
market dynamics have transition processes from previous cases: transition process are much less dynamic and 
settle down time is shorter for each price dynamic process. This is the effect of introduction of feedback signal. 
4.4 Chapter summary and discussions 
In this chapter, market dynamics with uncertainty under different expectations have been simulated. It is 
shown that market can be is modeled as control systems and systems theory and decision analysis can be applied 
to study market properties. With system state space equations obtained, market system properties are studied. 
Simulation examples show under uncertainty different expectations of GENCOs lead to different GENCOs 
decisions and market performance. It happens even though the market has same demand and GENCOs have 
same production cost. This can be verified by comparing simulation examples in this chapter in which GENCOs 
production cost and market characteristics are same while expectations are different. GENCOs' expectations can 
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Figure 4.7 Price dynamics with probabilistic estimate of other's response to demand-met-error 
be changed by changing market rules or organizations, such as introducing of demand-met-error feedback. 
Simulation results also show that market properties may be very different under different expectation and 
uncertainties. The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Probability distribution of estimate of other GENCO's output result in different GENCOs' decisions 
and market properties; 
• Price/quantity equilibrium, market share, and market power depend on all system parameters except 
fixed generation cost ci0 . ci0 does not influence market stability and equilibrium; 
• A lower marginal cost of a GENCO give the GENCO higher market share and more market power; 
• Under quantity competition with only price feedback and probabilistic estimate of other GENCO' 
output, the market is neither controllable nor observable. When a demand-met-error is introduced, the 
market may become controllable if the estimate of GENCOs are different but the market is always 
unobservable: market administrators may change market output through input but GENCOs' output 
can not be observed from market output; 
• Generally, the market is less dynamic when GENCOs adopts probabilistic expectation based on past 
market price and competition using a fixed probability distribution. This is because probabilistic 
expectation uses past price in more than one period and it equals to adding a low-pass filter into price 
feedback channel. This can be verified by comparing simulation examples in this chapter with those in 
chapter 3 with same market and expectation characteristics while expectations are certain. 
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5 ELECTRIC MARKET DYNAMICS SIMULATION: MULTI-PERIOD 
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION UNDER QUANTITY COMPETITION 
5.1 Chapter overview 
GENCOs with a good understanding of competition and markets may not be satisfied to only maximize gain 
in next period. They may want to maximize total gain over next several periods. In this chapter, how GENCOs 
make output decisions to maximize total profit (or total expected profit when uncertainty is present) in multiple 
successive periods under quantity competition with the estimate of competitors is studied. Based on a two-
GENCO market, the problem is seen from GENCOl's point of view as how to output decisions according to the 
estimate of GENC02 and the market. Four scenarios are studied: GENCOl has an estimate of GENC02's 
output, estimate of GENC02's output strategy, probabilistic estimate of GENC02's output, and probabilistic 
estimate of GENC02's strategy. 
5.2 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are been made for this chapter: 
• At time r, GENCOl needs to determine output in next two periods, q x  (t ) and g, ( t  +1) to maximize 
total profit in these two periods K — 1tx  (t) + 7Tx(t + X) \ 
• GENCOl has estimate of historical output GENC02 from market price, demand, and own output. 
5.3 GENCOl decision with estimate of GENC02 in next two periods 
Assume GENCOl has an estimate of GENC02's output at time t  and t+1 ,  q 2 ( t )  and q 2 ( t  +1), by 
expectations shown in chapters 3 and 4. Then, total profit for next two periods is 
7T-7C,{ t )  +  7r x { t  +  \ )  
10 = [a - b(q2 (f)+ qx (t ))]?, (t)-cxlqx(t)-cxo+[a-b(q2(t +1)+ qx (t + l))]tf, (f +1) - c,, qx (t + 1) - c 
To maximize total profit, the first order conditions are ^ = Q an(j — = 0 . 
d q , { t )  & ? , ( '  +  ! )  
When q x  ( t ) and q x  ( t  +1) are independent, which means the output interval in the market is so long that 
no technical constraints is effective, q, (t) and qx (t +1) are 
9i ( f )=  2£ U ~2 q 2 ^ q ^ t  +  ^ ~ 2b" ~~2 q 2 ^ t  +  ^  ^  ^  
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This is the conclusion obtained in Chapter 3 and 4. Actually, when q x  (t ) and q x  ( t  +1) are independent, 
maximizing total gain in two period will be same as maximizing profit for each period, respectively. 
When q x  ( t )  and q x  ( t  + 1) are interdependent and there are constraints between output in different 
successive periods, the problem becomes 
Where < p { q ( t ) , q ( t  +1)) is the constraint between q x  ( t )  and q x ( t  +1), which may be technical or economic. 
T C ( q ( t ) ,  q ( t  + 1 ) )  i s  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  c o s t  f r o m  q x  ( t )  t o  q x  ( t  + 1 )  .  
The new problem can be solved by many optimization methods, such as Dynamic Programming. The details 
for solving this problem in short-term market will be discussed in Chapter 7 and 8. The solution will be 
By replacing previous GENCO decision models with (5.1) and (5.2), GENCO decisions and market 
dynamics when GENCOs want to maximize total profit in more than one period could be obtained. It should be 
noticed that new systems may be nonlinear because of new constraint between outputs in different time. 
5.4 GENCOl decision with estimate of GENCOZ's output strategy 
GENCOs can use market information to estimate competitor's strategy by combining market information 
and their own bid results. GENCOs could first assume one strategy for competitors, use regressive algorithms to 
estimate parameters for the strategy, and make adjustments to strategy parameters to get the best fit. When 
necessary, they should switch to another strategy until a good strategy estimate is found. Then, GENCOs can 
make a good estimate of competitor's output in the next few periods and take advantage of that. 
Assume GENCOl has a conclusion based on historical data that GENC02's strategy is very close to naïve 
expectation. Then, GENCOl knows GENC02's output response to GENCOl's output is 
max vT, (0 + 7t x  ( t  + 1) -  T C ( q ( t ) ,  q ( t  + 1)) 
=  ~ b q i 2 ( t )  +  ( a  - c„ ) q x  ( t )  - b q 2  ( t )  q x  (t ) - c,0 
- b q t 2 ( t  + 1 )  +  ( a  -  c l x ) q x ( t  + 1 )  - b q 2 ( t  + 1 )  q x ( t  + 1 )  - c 1 0  
- T C ( q ( t ) , q ( t  +  l ) )  
Subjected to < p ( q ( t ) ,  q ( t  +1)) = 0 
i\ (0 = /i[g2(f), <&(*+1)] • 9i (<+i) = fi [?2 (f), (t+1)] (5.2) 
Therefore, 
(5.3) 
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q 2 ( t +  Y )  ~  q 2 ( t +  V )  - —^ (5.4) 
GENCOl's total profit in next two periods is 
7C =7t x ( t )  +  7i; x ( t  +  \ )  
- b q x 2 ( t )  +  ( a - c u  ) q x  ( t )  - b q 2  ( t )  q x  ( t )  
—  b q x { t  + 1) +  ( a  —  cn ) q x  ( t  +  l ) — b q 2 ( t  + 1 ) q x  ( t  + 1) — 2 cl0 
Substituting (5.3) and (5.4) into (5.5), we have 
j c  = {a -c n  -  U  2 ^ 2 1  b +  ^ -b ]q x  ( t )  -  bqf  ( t )  +  ^ q x  ( t )q x  ( t  +1)  
+ [a — cxx 21 b]qx(t + 1 ) — bqx{t + 1) 
(5.6) 
2b 
djC 
When q.  ( t )  and q x  ( t  +1) are independent, with — = 0 , then 
dq x  ( t  +1)  
dn 
Substitute (5.7) into (5.5), with the first order condition— = 0 , then 
dq x ( t )  
When q x  (?) and q x  ( t  +1) are interdependent, the problem can be solved by Dynamic Programming. 
Details for solving the problem are omitted. The solution will be 
9 , ( 0  =  f M x ( f - i ) L  9 , ( f + l )  =  f M i ( f - 1 ) ]  
Actually if GENC02's strategy is known, GENCOl sets output using backward induction because GENC02' 
decisions are based qi(t-l). The optimal qi(t+l) to maximize profit in t+1 depends on qt(i) and the optimal qt(t) 
to maximize profit in t and t+1 depends on qi(t-l). With qi(t-l) known, qrft) and qi(t+l) can be calculated. 
Naive expectation is assumed for GENC02 by GENCOl in the above discussion. Other estimates of 
competitor's strategies, such as adaptive expectation and moving average expectation, could be studied 
similarly. By replacing previous GENCO decision models developed in Chapters 3 and 4 with the new models 
developed in this section, electric market dynamics can be studied and simulated. 
53 
5.5 GENCOl decisions with probabilistic estimate of GENC02 
GENCOs may not be sure of their competitors' future output decisions. When they want to maximize total 
profit for ext few periods, their competitors' decisions during that time may be difficult to predict and a 
probabilistic estimate is necessary. Similar to estimate under certainty, GENCOs may have estimate of specific 
value of their competitor or probabilistic estimate of competitors' strategy. 
5.5.1 GENCOl decisions with probabilistic estimate of GENC02's output 
Assume GENCOl believes GENC02's output at time t+1  is 7i<?20 (0 with probability p t , where 
g20(?)is the base point of GENC02's output for time t and %is ratio coefficient between other possible 
outputs and the base point. Then, GENCOl tries to maximize its own expected profit, 
max(E(;r, (t ) + nx  (? +1))) 
- max E([a  -b(q 2  ( t )+  q x  (r))]ç, (t )  -c n q x  ( t )  +  
[a-b{q 2  (t  +1)4- q x  ( t  +  !) ) ]# ,  ( t  +1) -c n q x  ( t  +1) - 2cl0 ) 
= max {(a  -  c x ,  -  bq 2 0  (?)£  YiPt  ) t f ,  (? )  -  bq\  (?)  +  
_ (5.8) 
(a  -  c x x  -  bq 2 0 (?  +1)£  y i p i  )q x  ( t  +1)  -bq x  ( t  +1)  -  2c 1 0 }  
When q x  (?)  q x  (? +1) are independent, 
_ YkPk #2o(f+ 
2—•?'(,+1)=-sf r— (5'9) 
When they are interdependent, 
%(0 =  fAho( f )>  q 2 0 ( t  +1)]  '  ( f  +1)  =  / 6 [q 2 Q (?) ,  q 2 l j ( t  +1)]  
5.5.2 GENCOl decisions with probabilistic estimate Of GENC02's strategy 
Assume GENCOl believes that GENC02 has naïve expectations. With output from GENCOl at time t -1  is 
qi ( t - l  ) ,  at time t  GENC02 will set output as /, [ ^ 2 — q { { t  — 1)] with probability p t .  
To get GENCOl s output at time t  and t+1 ,  the conclusions from section 5.5.1 can be applied by using 
naï v e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t o  p r e d i c t  G E N C 0 2 ' s  o u t p u t  a n d  s e t  t h e  b a s e  p o i n t  q 2 0  ( ? )  a s  ^  2  —  q x { t  — 1 )  f o r  t i m e  t .  
After getting specific values of q 2 i  (?)  ,  q 2 i  (? +1) and associated probability p i , these probabilistic expectation 
v a l u e s  o f  G E N C 0 2 ' s  o u t p u t  c a n  b e  p u t  i n t o  ( 5 . 7 )  t o  g e t  t h e  o p t i m a l  v a l u e s  o f  q x  ( ? )  a n d  q x  (?  +1 ) .  
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5.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, how GENCOs make output decisions under quantity competition to make advanced 
decisions-to maximize profit in multi-periods with estimate of competitors-is studied. By replacing decision 
models in Chapter 3-4 with models developed in this chapter, more complex market dynamics can be studied. 
The new market system is shown in Figure 5.1. A multi-period output/strategy estimator is used by each 
GENCO in the market to help GENCOs make better decisions. 
Delay  Estim atlon Price 
Mul t i -per iod  Output /s t ra tegy 
Est imator  1  
Compet i to rs '  
Output  Output  
G E N C O  1  
- •Compet i to r 's  
Output  Output  
G E N C O 2  
Estlm atlon 
Price 
Total 
Output Price 
M a r k e t  d e m a n d  
P = a - b Q  
P :  P r i c e  
Q :  t o t a l  o u t p u t  
Delay  
Mul t i -per iod  Output /s t ra tegy 
Est imator  2  
Figure 5.1 An electric market with advanced estimators 
How GENCOs should make decisions to maximize total profit in two periods is studied. For day ahead 
market, total profit maximization for 24 hours with technical and economic constraints becomes a generation 
scheduling for GENCOs in deregulated market with impacts of competitors' decisions and market conditions. 
This generation scheduling problem is studied in chapters 7 and 8 in detail. 
It is assumed in this chapter that GENCO only care about other GENCOs strategy in next period and make 
own decision based on that. With consideration that GENCOs interact with each other in every period in the 
future, GENCOs may treat the interactions between themselves as a repeated game and make decision different 
from those studied here. A tentative discussion of repeated games for GENCOs can be found in [Correia, 2002]. 
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6 ELECTRIC MARKET DYNAMICS SIMULATIONS UNDER OTHER 
COMPETITIONS 
6.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter first studies GENCOs' decision models with interactions between GENCOs under price 
competition and both price and quantity competitions. Corresponding electric market dynamics are simulated. 
Then, how to use models developed in this work to study electric market dynamics in other situations and energy 
market dynamics is shown. Dynamic models of two electric markets connected by transmission networks and 
models of energy market dynamics are presented as examples. 
6.2 Electric market dynamics under price competition 
6.2.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
• Competition in the market is price competition. Market is run by auction: price is chosen as the 
minimum price submitted. Bid with minimum price is accepted first. If demand is not fully met, bid 
with second lowest price is accepted and so on. If price bids are the same, demands are divided by 
bidders evenly. 
• There are two GENCOs with linear cost functions in the market. 
The market system under price competition is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
GENC01 
Market 
Pm = min( Pi, P2) 
GENCO 2 
Delay 
Delay 
Market Price 
Bid Price 
Market Price 
Bid Price 
Market 
Price 
Figure 6.1 An electric market under price competition 
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6.2.2 GENCO decision-making 
There are three scenarios for two GENCOs under price competition: 
• Both GENCOs could meet all demand; 
• One GENCO can meet all demand and one GENCO can not; 
• Neither of two GENCO can meet all demand. 
The first scenario is discussed below. In the second and third scenarios, GENCOs need to make both price 
and output quantity decisions and these scenarios can be seen as both quantity and quantity competition. These 
two scenarios are discussed in section 6.3. 
With linear cost function, GENCOs always try to bid full demand to get more profit as long as price is 
higher than its variable cost. When both GENCOs could meet all demands, bid with a higher price will not get 
accepted. GENCO with a lower variable cost (assume it is GENCOl) can find the other's variable cost by 
testing market-decrease the bid price until it get all demand. This information can then be utilized-GENCO 1 
will try to maximize the profit by setting bid price slightly lower than the other's variable cost. A special case is 
that both GENCOs have same variable cost. They can know this by testing market for enough time and they will 
both bid the variable cost to get half demand if it is profitable. 
The market system model under price competition is 
P i ( t ) =  f (  V C v p { t - \ ) , p m ( t - \ ) )  
P 2 ( t ) =  f ( V C 2 , p 2 ( t - \ ) , p m ( t - \ ) )  
[ q x  ( t ) ,  q 2  ( t ) ,  p m  ( t ) ]  =  a u c t i o n ( p x  ( f ) ,  p 2  ( t ) ,  q d  ( t )  )  
where pit) is the bid price, q,(t) are accepted quantity for GENCO i, VC, is the variable cost of GENCO i, pm(t) 
is the market price at time t, qjt) is the demand quantity, and auction ( ) represents market rules to determine 
bid results.. It is assumed that both GENCOs submit bid quantity equal to demand. 
It should be noticed that the new market system is a non-linear system. The market dynamics last till the 
GENCO with lower variable cost finds the other's variable cost by testing the market. 
A two-GENCO market in which GENCOs are under price competition has been simulated. Table 6.1 shows 
different parameters for GENCOs and market properties resulted from those parameters. It is assumed both 
GENCOs have naïve expectation for the other's price and test market based on that assumption. Demand is 
assumed as 25. The following observations can be made: 
• Under price competition, as long as demand price is higher than variable cost of GENCOs, 
price/quantity equilibrium exist; equilibrium properties depends on all system parameters except fixed 
generation cost; 
• If GENCOs have same marginal cost, nether of them has any market power. 
• Final market price is close to the highest variable cost (VC) of GENCO in market. It will be set either 
equal or slightly lower to the highest VC by GENCO with lower VC to beat the other one. 
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Table 6.1 Market properties when GENCOs are under price competition 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 
a 6 7 6 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Cll 3 3 2 
Cl2 3 3 3 
Stable? Yes Yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
Pi.qi 3.0,12.5 3.0,12.5 2.99,25 
P2, <72 3.0,12.5 3.0,12.5 3,0 
Q 25 25 25 
Price 3.0 3.0 2.99 
Market properties 
MP,,MP2 0,0 0,0 0.495,-0.003 
MS,,MS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 1.00,0 
System output (price) dynamics is shown in Figure 6.2. The price dynamics are simple compared with 
dynamics studied previously. Market dynamics stop when GENCOs finish test market (to find the VC of the 
other one by lowering its price bid) and find optimal price decision to maximize profit. 
4.5 
case 1 
3.5 8 
— CL 
base case N case 2 
2.5 
150 200 50 100 0 
time 
Figure 6.2 Price dynamics when GENCOs are under price competition 
6.3 Electric market dynamics under price and quantity competition 
6.3.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
• Competition is both quantity and price competition. 
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• The market is run by a discriminatory auction. The bid with the lowest price is accepted first. If the 
demand is not fully met, the bid with the second lowest price is accepted, and so on. If the price bids of 
GENCOs are the same, the demand is divided in bidders evenly. The final accepted prices for each 
GENCO may be different. 
• There are two GENCOs in the market. 
6.3.2 GENCO decisions under price and quantity competition 
The market under both price and quantity competitions is illustrated in Figure 6.3. With market information 
and price/quantity accepted, GENCOs could use a forecasting technique to form an estimate of the other's bid in 
the last period. Then, GENCOs could predict the other's future bidding decisions and make their own decisions. 
Estimator 1 
GENCO1 
Market 
GENCO 2 
Delay 
Delay 
Delay 
Delay 
Carpe# tor's Q 
Conpeli tor's P Quantity 
FYice 
ConpetitorP 
Competitor Q Quantity 
Price 
Conpetitors' Quantity 
Qjantity 
Conpetitors' Price 
Price 
Conpetitors' 
Qjantity Qjantity 
Conpetitors' 
Price Price 
Quantity 
FYice 
Estimator 2 
Figure 6.3 An electric market under price and quantity competition 
Assume adaptive expectation is used by both GENCOs. GENCO i would forecast GENCO /s bid price and 
quantity in next period by 
P j  M -  P j  ('-!) = P p  (P j  0 "  1) -  P j  ( t  ~  1)) 
q} (0 - Qj (t ~ 1) = Pq (qj (t ~ 1) - qj (t -1)) 
where fip and are adjusting coefficients for price and quantity, respectively. 
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Next, GENCO i compares possible bidding results and selects decisions with the most profit. For GENCOl, 
a t  t i m e  t ,  i t  c o u l d  s e t  p x  ( t )  >  p 2  ( t )  .  T h e n  t h e  m a x i m u m  g e n e r a t i o n  a m o u n t  i t  c o u l d  s e l l  i s  q d  ( t )  — q 2  ( t )  .  
Thus, GENCOl faces the following problem: 
Case 1 : max7t ( t )  =  q x ( t )p x ( t ) -c,(q x ( t ) )  
Pi .«I 
St. qx  (t) < qd (t) - q2 (t) ,g lm in  < qx  (t) <q ]ma,pd (0 > px  (0 > p2 (0 
where 1t is the profit of GENCOl, q,(t) is the bidding quantity of GENCO z, p,(t) is the bidding price of 
GENCO i, c,{.) is the generation cost function of GENCO i, pjtj is the maximum price demand would pay, 
qjt) is the maximum demand amount at the price of pjt). An implied assumption is that p,<t) < pjt) 
If GENCOl chooses p x ( t )  <  p 2 ( t )  , it can sell generation up to full demand. The problem then becomes 
C a s e 2  max<f)  =q x ( t )p x ( t )  -c x (q x ( t ) )  
Mi 
St q x ( t )  <q d ( t )  .tfimin <q x ( t )  <q l m a ,p x ( t )  <  p 2 ( t )  
GENCOl may choose not to produce if it cannot make positive profit in case l or 2. 
Case 3 Jt = 0 
GENCOl also needs to compare the profit when its price equal to other's price with profit in other cases. 
Case4 n( t )  =  q x ( t )p x ( t )  ~c x (q x ( t ) )  
St q x ( t )  =0.5q d ( t )  ,q l n i D  <q x ( t )  <q l m m ,p x ( t )  =  P 2 ( t )  
Since Case 4 rarely happens, it is not discussed in later discussion. But it should be known that GENCOs 
have such an option. In summary, the problem GENCOl needs to solve is 
maximum profit in Case l 
maximum profit in Case 2 
Max 
Profit in Case 3 
Profit in Case 4 
The decision-making of GENCOs are illustrated in Figure 6.4. The market model is 
lp{ t ) ,  q x ( t ) ]  =  f ' (  p j  M ),  q j  t - \ ) ,p 2 (  t ) ,  q 2  (  t ) )  
[P 2 ( t ) ,  q 2 ( t ) ]  =  f ' (p j t - l ) ,  q c 2 ( t - \ )  ,p x ( t ) ,q x ( t )  )  
[p j t ) ,  q j t ) ,p j t ) ,  q c 2 ( t ) ]  =  auct ion(pj t ) ,  q d ( t )  ,p x ( t ) ,  q x ( t ) ,p 2 ( t ) ,  q 2 ( t ) )  
where p c i ( t ) ,  q c i ( t )  are accepted price and quantity for GENCO i, p t ( t ) ,  q t ( t )  are the submitted bid price and 
quantity for GENCO i, p d ( t ) ,  q d ( t )  are the market demand quantity and maximum payable price, f() is the 
decision process in Figure 6.4 with estimate of competitor's price and quantity by expectations, auction ( ) 
represents market auction rules. The system is non linear because of the auctions. 
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Figure 6.4 Decision-making inside GENCOs under price and quantity competition 
A two-GENCO market in which GENCOs are under price and quantity competition is simulated. GENCOs 
are assumed to use adaptive expectation to predict competitor's submitted price and quantity. Table 6.2 shows 
parameters for GENCOs and market properties resulting from them. 
The following observations can be made: 
• Under price and quantity competition, price/quantity equilibrium, if any, and market power and market 
share depend on all system parameters except fixed generation cost; 
• A lower marginal cost of a GENCO gives the GENCO more market power; 
a 
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) doesn't necessarily give GENCOs more market power. This is 
b  
because under price and quantity competition, the price at which GENCOs are paid is not only 
determined by demand property, but also how other GENCO submit price bid.. This makes the effect of 
demand elasticity on final GENCO price less and estimate of other's price more important; 
• Quantity competition and price competition are correlated. The market won't reach steady state until 
both quantity and price reach steady state 
Dynamics of accepted price and quantity of GENCOl are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. As can been seen, 
quantity competition and price competition are correlated. Both competitions should be studied at the same time 
to evaluate market properties. For example, in Figure 6.6 and 6.6, in base case , case 1 and 2, the quantity has 
already reached steady state at t =5. However, the price competition is still ongoing until t =10. 
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Table 6.2 Market properties when GENCOs are under price and quantity competition 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 
a 10 8 10 10 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Cll 3 3 2 3 
0.7,0.8 0.7,0.8 0.7,0.8 0.8,0.9 
C/2 3 3 3 3 
/W,2 
0.7,0.8 0.7,0.8 0.7,0.8 0.7,0.8 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
PuQi 6.605,10 5.085,10 6.605,10 6.238,10 
P2, <72 6.605,10 5.085,10 6.605,10 6.238,10 
Q 20 20 20 20 
Price 6.605 5.085 6.605 6.605 
Market properties 
MP,,MP2 1.202,1.202 0.695,0.695 2.303,1.202 1.079,1.079 
MS,,MS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 
8.5 , 
base case case 2 
case 3 
5.5 -
5 -
4.5 -
4 --
0 
case 1 
10 
time 
15 20 
Figure 6.5 Accepted quantity dynamics for GENCOl under price and quantity competition 
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Figure 6.6 Accepted price dynamics for GENCOl under price and quantity competition 
6.3.3 GENCO decisions under price and quantity competition under uncertainty 
A probabilistic estimation of competitor's actions must be made when there is uncertainty. Assume GENCO 
i believes its competitor will choose from k-1, 2, .... K possible output quantities and prices for the next period 
with different probabilities. To be more specific, GENCO i forecasts GENCO j will set output to y[kq q/1-1) at 
time t with probability Pikq, where q/t-1) is the competitor's output at time t-1. GENCO i also forecasts 
GENCO j will set price to Yikpp/t-l) at time t with probability P i kp , where p/t-1) is competitor's price at time 
t-1. The market under probabilistic estimate is shown in Figure 6.7. 
To systematically deal with uncertainty, GENCOs should apply decision analysis. The decision process of 
GENCO i to set price and quantity can be represented by the decision tree in Figure 6.8. In Figure 6.8, qmin and 
qmax are the lower and upper bounds of output because of technical constraints, pmin and pmax are lower and upper 
bounds of feasible price because of competition and market conditions. Both price and quantity decision 
variables are continuous. Only one branch of the decision tree are completely shown .The other branches are 
similar to it. 
Since GENCOs are risk neutral, they try to maximize expected profit. 
£<X0)) = E (P« (t)qc i  (t) - c, (q c i  (0) = J] Y i kq  X 7 i kp  (pc i  (t)q c i  (?)  -  c, (q c i  ( / ) )  
where p c i ( t ) ,  q c i ( t )a ie  accepted quantity and price and they are functions of submitted bid price and quantity 
Pi (0> <ii (0 • GENCOS then calculate p( (t), qi (f) to maximize expected gain. 
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Figure 6.7 An electric market with GENCOs under price and quantity competition under uncertainty 
The resulting market system model is 
[ P i ( t ) ,  q x ( t ) ]  =  f"(p c l ( t - l ) ,  qJ t - l ) ,Y l k p ,p l k p ,p 2 ( t - l ) , y l k q ,p l k q ,q 2 ( t - l ) )  
[p 2 ( t ) ,  q 2 ( t ) ]  =  q c 2 ( t - i ) , r 2 k q >P2 k p>Pi( t - l )>r2 k q 'p2 i a ,>qi ( t - \ ) )  
[pJO,  q j t ) ,p j t ) ,  q j t ) ]  =  auct ion(p d ( t ) ,  q d ( t )  ,p x ( t ) ,  q x ( t ) ,p 2 ( t ) ,  q 2 ( t ) )  
where p d ( t ) ,  q d ( t )  are the market demand quantity and maximum payable price, f ' ( )  is the expected profit 
maximizing with probabilistic estimate of competitor's price and quantity by expectations, and auction ( ) 
represents market auction rules. The system is non linear because of the auctions. 
A two-GENCO market in which GENCOs make decisions under uncertainty under price and quantity 
competition is simulated. Table 6.3 shows different parameters for GENCOs and market properties resulted 
from those parameters. 
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Figure 6.8 Decision tree for GENCO under price and quantity competition under uncertainty 
Table 6.3 Market properties when GENCOs are under price and quantity competition under uncertainty 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 
a 10 8 10 10 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
cll 3 3 2 3 
Y\kp- P\kp 0.8,1.0,1.2 0.1,0.8,0.1 
0.8,1.0,1.2 
0.1,0.8,0.1 
0.8,1.0,1.2 
0.1,0.8,0.1 
0.7,1.1,12 
0.3,0.4,0.3 
Y\kq• P\kq 0.8,1.0,1.2 0.8,1.0,1.2 0.8,1.0,1.2 0.8,1.0,1.2 0.1,0.8,0.1 0.1,0.8,0.1 0.1,0.8,0.1 0.1,0.8,0.1 
cl2 3 3 3 3 
Ylkp• Plkp 0.7,1.0,1.3 0.7,1.0,1.3 0.7,1.0,1.3 0.7,1.0,1.3 0.2,0.6,0.2 0.2,0.6,0.2 0.2,0.6,0.2 0.2,0.6,0.2 
Ylkq• Plkq 0.7,1.0,1.3 0.2,0.6,0.2 
0.7,1.0,1.3 
0.2,0.6,0.2 
0.7,1.0,1.3 
0.2,0.6,0.2 
0.7,1.0,1.3 
0.2,0.6,0.2 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
pi'qi 8.0,10 4,10 8,10 8,13 
p2> <72 8.0,10 4,10 8,10 8,10 
q 20 20 20 20 
Price 8 4 8 8 
Market properties 
mp,,mp2 1.667,1.667 0.333,0.333 3.000,1.667 1.667,1.667 
ms,,ms2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 
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The following observations can be made: 
• Under uncertainty, under price and quantity competition, price/quantity equilibrium, if any, market 
power, and market share depend on all system parameters except fixed generation cost; 
• A lower marginal cost of a GENCO leads to higher market power of that GENCO; 
a 
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) doesn't necessarily give GENCOs more market power; 
b 
• Quantity competition and price competition are correlated; 
• Price dynamics are less dynamic than those under certainty. This is because of the filter effect of using 
weighted average of historical price/quantity values to form expectations. 
Dynamics of accepted price and quantity of GENCO 1 are shown in Figures 6.9 and 6.10. It can be seen that 
the market dynamics are generally less dynamic than market dynamics because of fixed probability assumption. 
base case case 2 case 3 
case 1 
Figure 6.9 Price dynamics GENCO under price and quantity competition under uncertainty 
6.3.4 GENCOs decisions under price and quantity competition with feedback 
A Market in which there is demand-met-error feedback under both price and quantity competition is 
illustrated in Figure 6.11. GENCOs get information from market (demand-met-error) and have an estimate of the 
competitor's response using expectations. Then, GENCOs adjust the bid price and quantity based on that 
estimate. The GENCO decision-making process is similar to that shown in section 6.3.3. The difference is 
GENCOs use the demand-met-error to get estimate other's actions. 
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base case case 3 case 1 
case 2 
Figure 6.10 Quantity dynamics under price and quantity competition under uncertainty 
The market model is 
lP\(t) , qx(t)] = f"(pjt-l), qJt-l),p2(t),q2(t),qderror(t-l)) 
[P 2 ( t ) ,  q 2 ( t ) ]  =  f '"(  p j t - l ) ,  q j t - l )  , />i  ( t ) ,q l  ( t ) ,q d e r r o r ( t - \  )  )  
q d e r r o r ( =  q j M  H 2 ( M  )  
[pjt)< qJ^'PciW' q^Wl = auction(pd(t), qd(t) ,px(t), qjtj.pjt), q2(t)) 
where pci(t), qci(t) are accepted price and quantity of GENCO i, pt(t), qt(t) are the submitted bid price and 
quantity for GENCO i, pd(t), qd(t) are demand quantity and maximum payable price, f"'() is the GENCO 
decision process with estimate of competitor's price and quantity by expectations with feedback, auction ( ) 
represents market auction rules. The system is non linear because of auctions. 
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Figure 6.11 An electric market under price and quantity competition with feedback 
Table 6.4 shows parameters for GENCOs in market with demand-met-error feedback and resulted market 
properties. GENCOs are assumed to use adaptive expectation to predict competitor's submitted price and naive 
expectation to predict competitor's response to demand-met-error. Load forecast is set as 20. 
Table 6.4 Market dynamics under price and quantity competition with demand-met-error feedback 
Parameters 
Case Base 1 2 3 
a 10 8 10 10 
b 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Cll 3 3 2 3 
0.8, 0.7 0.8, 0.7 0.8, 0.7 0.9,0.8 
C/2 3 3 3 3 
Pip '  ^ Iq 0.8, 0.7 0.8,0.7 0.8, 0.7 0.8, 0.7 
Stable? Yes Yes yes Yes 
Equilibrium properties 
Pi.qi 6.473,7.5 5.067,7.5 6.473,7.5 6.181,7.5 
P2< <72 6.473,7.5 5.067,7.5 6.473,7.5 6.181,1.5 
Q 15 15 15 15 
Price 8.5 6.5 8.5 7.5 
Market properties 
MP,, MP 2 1.158,1.158 0.689,0.689 2.237,1.158 1.060,1.060 
MShMS2 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 0.5,0.5 
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The following observations can be made: 
• Under price and quantity competition, price/quantity equilibrium, if any, market power, and market 
share depend on all system parameters except fixed generation cost; 
• A lower marginal cost of a GENCO gives the GENCO more market power; 
a 
• A more inelastic demand (with less — ) doesn't necessarily give GENCOs more market power; 
b 
• Quantity competition and price competition are correlated. The market won't reach steady state until 
both quantity and price reach steady state. Both competitions should be studied at the same time to 
evaluate market properties. 
The dynamics of accepted price and quantity of GENCO 1 are shown in Figure 6.12 and 6.13. With 
demand-error-feedback under price and quantity competition, GENCOs make decisions different from those in 
other situations. 
time 
Figure 6.12 Price dynamics under price and quantity competition with demand-met-error feedback 
6.4 Application examples of the electric market dynamic models 
Until now GENCO decisions under different market conditions with interactions between GENCOs are 
studied and the corresponding market dynamics are simulated. This section shows how to use the method 
already discussed to model and analyze some other problems. The first one is how to model GENCO decisions 
in two electric markets. The second one is how to model an energy market consisting of fuel companies, 
GENCOs and consumers with interactions between them 
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6.4.1 Electric market dynamic model with GENCO profit maximizing in two markets 
This section studies GENCOs output decision-making models to maximize total profit in two electric 
markets and the resulting market dynamics. 
6.4.1.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
• There are two markets. Both GENCOs are in Market 1 and have access to Market 2 through 
transmission networks; 
• Demand in each market can be represented by a> , j = 1,2; 
• There is a transmission cost, TC(q), where q is flow on the networks; 
• There is no transmission limitation. GENCOs can transfer up to any amount they want. 
Such a market is shown in Figure 6.14. 
6.4.1.2 GENCO decisions and market system dynamic model 
Now, GENCO i tries to maximize its total profit in two markets. 
where p, is market price of market j, is output of GENCO fs sold amount in market j ,  C,(  )  is generation cost 
function. ci {qt ) = Ci{qi + ci0, TC( ) is transmission cost. 
(0 = Pi  { t )q n  (t ) + p 2  ( t )q i 2  (*)  -  c ,  (9,1 (0+q, i  (t ) ) -TC (q, 2  ( t ) )  
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Figure 6.14 Two electric markets connected by transmission networks 
Therefore, for GEN CO 1 
(') = K - bi (9,i (0 + 92, (O)kn -(')'+ l a2 - b2 (9l2 (0 + 922 C))toi2 (') 
~ C[qx, (f ) + g12 (r )] - TC(q l2 (t )) 
To maximize profit, GENCO 1 needs to estimate GENC02's output in both markets. Assume GENCO 1 can use 
adaptive forecasting. That is, 
<?2i (0 ~ <h\ (f - D = Pu (^2i (? ~ 1) ~ 921 (f - D) 
922 (0 - 922 (*•"!) = Pl2 (922 (f ~ D ~ 9%2 (f ~ D) 
where ^ is the GENC02 's output in market j at time t. $2\ •> P22 arc adjusting constants. With these 
expectations, GENCO 1 can find profit maximizing output in two markets. Similarly, GENC02 can find its 
optimal output decisions. 
To model the two-market system, choose state variables as ^21, ^22, ^22 ^21> ^12' and the 
prices in two markets as system outputs. The system can be modeled by the following 8th order system. System 
state space equations are 
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q n ( t  +1)  
q l 2 ( t  +1)  
9,2 (r + 1) "0 0 * * * * 0 0 
A 0 0 * * * * 0 0 
q n ( t  + 1) 0 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 
q 2 2 ( l  +1)  0 0 0 * 0 * 0 0 
q 2 l ( t  +  \ )  * * * * 0 0 0 0 
q 2 2 ( t  +  l )  * * * * 0 0 0 0 
A 
* 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 
9i,(r + l) 
0 * 0 0 0 0 0 * 
9n(0 
9,2 (0 
92,(0 
q 2 2  ( t )  
92, (0 
922 (0 
9,i(0 
.9,2(0. 
+ 
pi 
.p2. 
-6, 0 
0 -fr, 
0 0  -b ,  
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
+ 
9u (0 
9,2 (0 
*2,(0 
922(0 
92,(0 
922 (0 
9,1 (0 
.9,2 (0 
In the above equation, represents non-zero element. 
Market dynamic properties, such as equilibriums, achievability of equilibrium, and transition processes, can 
then be obtained by these state space equations. 
6.4.1.3 Transmission networks with limitation 
When there is transmission limitation on the networks between two markets, transmission right - the right to 
utilize the network- becomes the key to competition. GENCOs who own transmission right could actually block 
others from market penetration. 
Now competition between two GENCOs must be both price and quantity competition. Rules of competition 
and how transmission rights are granted need be defined. Both GENCOs can use various forecasting techniques 
to predict the other's action and make their own decision based on estimates. System model can be applied with 
the following modifications: 
• Adding a transmission right market. 
• Adding state variables to represent transmission market decisions, estimate, and interactions. 
• Adding output variables to show transmission right market output dynamics. 
• Modifying decision-making in two markets to reflect interactions with transmission right market. 
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6.4.2 Energy market dynamics model 
This section provides a model to study interactions between fuel market, electric market, and the 
consumers. The underlying problem is consumer heating problem-consumer demand is met either by fuel or 
electricity, while electricity is generated by fuel. Decisions of fuel companies, GENCOs, and consumers are 
modeled. 
6.4.2.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
• There are three markets: a fuel market for GENCOs, an electric market for consumers, and a fuel 
market for consumers; 
• There are two fuel companies, two GENCOs, and an aggregated consumer; 
• Demand for fuel in the fuel market is P f  — a f  — b f  Q f  ; 
• Demand for electricity in the consumer electric market is Pec = aec — becQec ; 
• Demand for fuel in the consumer fuel market is P f i. = a f i. — b fcQ fc ; 
• Objective for the fuel company and GENCOs is to maximize profit; 
• Objective of the consumer is to maximize utility, which is to minimize cost of fuel and electricity. 
Such an energy market system is shown in Figure 6.15. 
GENC02 GENCO 1 
Fuel market 
Consumer 
Fuel market 
Fuel Company 2 Fuel Companyl 
Consumer 
Electric market 
Consumers 
Figure 6.15 An energy market system 
6.4.2.2 Problem for consumer 
The problem for the consumer is to minimize the total cost of energy: 
Min imize  p f c q f c  +  p e c q e c  
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where p fc is the price in the consumer fuel market, q fc is the fuel quantity the consumer bought, pec is the 
price in the consumer electric market, qec is the electricity quantity the consumer bought. 
Constraints for the consumer include: 
• heat requirement k fcq fc +kecqec > HEAT ..where k fc is the heat coefficient of fuel, k fc is the 
heat coefficient of electricity, and HEAT is the minimum heat amount the consumer needs; 
• minimum electricity consumption qec > Qec,.where Qec is the minimum requirement for electricity ; 
• minimum fuel consumption q fc > Q fc ..where Q fc is the minimum requirement for fuel ; 
This consumer heating problem can be solved by many methods, such as linear programming. The solution 
would be 
Ifc ~ kqfcO + kqfci Pec +^qfclPfc 
1ec = kqecO + k qeel Pec + kqec2 P fc 
where kqfc0,kqfcl ,£^2 ,kqec0 ,kqecl ,kqec2 are constants. Consumption of fuel and electricity depends on the 
prices of fuel and electricity. The substitution effect of fuel and electricity is included. 
6.4.2.3 Fuel company decision 
Fuel companies want to maximize total profit in two markets: fuel market and consumer fuel market. 
p fc{t)q fc{t)+ p f  (t)q/f)- FC[q fc{t)+q f  {t)\ 
where FC ( ) is the fuel production cost function. Fuel companies' decisions are based on their estimate of the 
other's actions in both markets. 
Xfi  (*)  =  K ~ b f  (q f i  ( t )  +  q f ]  { t ) ) ]q f i { t )  +  [a f c  -b f c (q f c i  ( t )  +  q j c j  ( f ) ) ]g f c i (f) 
- q &(*) ] 
when the fuel production is linear, the fuel market and consumer fuel market are decoupled. 
Now assume the fuel production is quadratic , the fuel market and consumer fuel market are coupled. 
X f i{t) = [a f  -b f(q f l(t) + qs(t))]q f i  (/)+[« fc -b fc (q fci (t) + q fcj (t))]q fci (f) 
- c f2 [q f l  (0+ q fci (Of -c f l  [q f i  (t)+q fci (?)]" c/0 
If the fuel production is linear, the fuel market and consumer fuel market are decoupled. The market model 
for each market can be easily built with models already developed. Now assume the fuel production is quadratic, 
the fuel market and consumer fuel market are coupled. 
Assume both fuel companies use adaptive expectation to forecast competitor's action in two markets. 
4 f j ( t )  =  q  J j( t  -1)  +  f i f j(q  f j ( t  -  I)  ~  q  f j ( t  -  l) )  
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9/y (f)-9/y (f-l)+ Pfcj { q fcj (t - l ) - q  fij (f - 1)) 
Substitute these expectation into the profit , the optimal fuel output in two markets for GENCO i  can be 
obtained. 
A A 
q f i  =  k î o  +  k j f \ q f j  +  k j f 2  q f ]  +  k i f 3 q f c j  +  k j f 4  q f c j  
q f c i  = k k 0  + k l c f l q f j  + k i c f 2  q f ]  +  k k f 3 q f c j  + k j c f 4  q f c j  
w h e r e  k i 0,kifl,kif2,kjf3,kif4 kcl0, kicfl, klcf2, kicf3, kjcf4 are constant determined by fuel production cost , 
fuel market demand, consumer fuel market demand , and expectation parameters. 
Choose q f l ( t ) , q f c X ( t ) , q f 2 ( t ) ,  q f c 2 ( t ) , q f 2 ( t ) , q f c 2 ( t ) , q f l ( t ) , q f c l ( t )  as state variables and market 
prices as output variables. The fuel market, including fuel market for GENCOs and fuel market for consumers, 
can be modeled as 
9/i (f + 1) 9/i (0 
4/ci(f + 1) " 0 0 k \ f 2  k \ f 4  K f \  k \ f i  0 0 9/cC) k \o 
q f 2 ( t  + 1) 0 
0 
0 
0 
k \ f 2  
l
~ P f i  
k \ f 2  
0 
k \ f i  
P n  
k \ f 3  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9/2 (0 kc\o 
0 
9/C2^ + 1) 0 0 0 1 P fci 0 Pfcl 0 0 9^(0 
+ 
0 
q f 2 ( t  + 1) ^2/1 k 2fi 0 0 0 0 K f i  k \f 4 9/2 (0 k 2o 
9/c2 (f + 1) k\/\ k \ /3 0 0 0 0 K f i  k \f ^ 9fc2 (0 kc20 
A P n  0 0 0 0 0 l ~ P f i  0 A 0 
9/i (^ + 1) 0 Pfc\ 0 0 0 0 0 1-^1 9/1 (0 0 
9/cl(f + l)_ q  fc\ (0 _ 
- b t  0 0 - b t  
0 - b f „  0 0 0 
0 
- b .  
0 0 
0 0 
9/i (f) 
W) 
q f 2  (0 
9/2 O 
9/c2(0 
9/1 (0 
9/ci(f) 
+ 
l f c .  
where * represents non-zero elements. 
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6.4.2.4 GENCOs decision 
GENCOs want to maximize profit in the electric market. Their models have already been extensively 
discussed. Assume they use adaptive expectations to estimate the competitor's actions. Choose 9, , 
q t  (t), q 2  ( t )  as state variables and market price as output. The electric market can then be represented by the 
following 4th-order system: 
9,i (f + i) 
Qei (* + O 
1e2 (' + O 
flcl + l) 
0 0 _A 
2 
i - A  
2 
A i - A  0 0 
_A i - A  0 0 
2 2 
0 0 A i - A  
[9„ W 
a, -c„ 
26, 
+ 
0 
9,2 W 
|_9^W_ 
— C21 
2 b2 
0 
= [-be 0 -be 0 
9»" 
<,(f) 
9,2^) 
qM 
+ a. 
Since fuel cost price is function of fuel output of both companies in fuel market and it changes GENCO 
production cost, fuel output has impact on GENCO decisions. .Assume generation cost is 
COSTi = cnqi +C-0 = c'j-j pfcq, + c'j0 p{c . For GENCOs, fuel price is given and is constant during their 
profit maximizing problem. Thus we only need modify the cost coefficient of GENCO production cost in the 
electric market. The market model becomes 
9,i (f + l) 
<le] O +l) 
9e 2^ + l) 
(t +l). 
0 0 .A i - A  
2 2 
A i - A  0 0 
„A i - A  0 0 
2 2 
0 0 A i - A  
9.1 W 
9^i W 
9.2 W 
lelit). 
+ 
a\ c ii bf (9/i 9/2 
2b, 
a2 c i2 \-af bf(q/\ "^9/2)] 
2~b2 
0 
It should be pointed out that although output in fuel market and input in electric market are related, they are 
not necessarily equal. This is because fuel, such as gas and coal, can be efficiently stored. Therefore, total 
inventory of fuel, qfinv (?), is introduced 
9/f„v (' + 1) = 9/1 (0+  I f  2  (0 '- K  9,1 (/) '" Mrt (0 '+ 9 f i n v  (0 
where h, and h2 are heat rate of GENCO 1 and GENC02. 
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6.4.2.5 Energy market model 
Now the energy market system model can be obtained by incorporating fuel market models, electric market 
model and consumer decision model. State variables for this system are 
9,i (0,9,i (0,9,2 (0,9,2 ('), 9/i (0,9fi (0,9/2 (0, 9f2 (0,9/2 ('), ('X 9/, (0,9/ri (0 9^ (0 The 
Output of the system is pf (t), pec(t), pfc{t). The energy market system can then be represented by the 
following 12th-order state space equations: 
9.,(f + l) 
9/cl(f+l) 
9.2 (f + 1) o * * 0 * 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0" 9.2(f) 
le2 (Z + D 0 * * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.2(f) 
A 
* 0 0 * * 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 
A 
le 1 (* + D 9.1(f) 
* 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
qfl(t + l) 9/1 (f) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 * * * * 0 0 0 
9/ci(f + 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 * * * * 0 0 0 9*i(0 
qf2(t + i) = 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 0 9/2 (f) 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 A q f c  2('+i) 
0 0 0 0 * * 0 0 0 0 * * 0 9*2(0 
9/2 (t + 1) 0 0 0 0 * * 0 0 0 0 * * 0 9/2 (f) 
9/C2^ + 1) 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 9*2(0 
9/i (*+ 1) 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 9/1 (0 
A * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 * A 
9.i(0 
9*1 (0 
9/mv(0 
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Pe( 0 ~be 0 
-K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0" 
P f (  0  = 0 0 0 0 
-K 0 0 0 ~be 0 0 0 0 
P*(f)_ 0 0 0 0 0 ~be 0 0 0 ~be 0 0 0 
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9.2W 
9.2(f) 
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9/i (0 
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9 f inv  (0 
With the energy market system models developed above, market performance and interactions between 
different market participants (fuel companies and GENCOs) can be studied. 
An energy market has been simulated. Demand in fuel market is Pf =6 — Qf. Demand in electric market 
is Pe =10 — Qe. Demand in consumer fuel market is Pf = 5 — Qf . Production cost for fuel companies is 
COSTi — q2f + 3qf + 2 ; Production cost for GENCOs is COSTi = 3qe + 2. Assume all companies adopt 
adaptive expectation with y# =0.8. Heat rate for GENCOs are assumed as 0.2. The price dynamics in fuel 
market, consumer fuel market and electric market are shown in Figure 6.16. It can be seen that all three market 
experience different dynamic transition processes. 
6.4.2.6 Discussions 
Energy market models with interaction in fuel markets, in electric markets, and between fuel market and 
electric market have been developed. One application of this model is to study "double marginalization" 
problem with fuel companies (upstream) and GENCOs (downstream) [Spengler, 1950]. How interaction 
between companies in same market and in correlated markets change decisions of companies, market 
performance, and market properties can be studied. 
78 
market price dynamics 
12 i 
- electric market price 
- fuel market price 
• consumer fuel market price 
in 
o. 
4 -
0 
0 10 time 20 30 
Figure 6.16 Energy market price dynamics 
Consumers in the energy market model are assumed as price taker. Like GENCOs in electric market, they 
may adopt certain expectations of market price, actions of GENCOs, and other consumers to make their 
electricity and fuel consumptions. With interactions between consumers, GENCOs and fuel companies, the 
energy market model and dynamics will become different. A discussion of interactions between consumers and 
GENCOs and their effect on the electric market dynamics can be found in [Yang, 2000]. 
6.5 Chapter summary 
How GENCO should make decisions under price competition only and under quantity and price 
competition are studied. Simulation results show interactions between GENCOs are important to GENCO 
decisions and market performance. The following conclusions can be drawn: 
• Under price competition, as long as demand price is higher than variable cost of GENCOs, 
price/quantity equilibrium exist; equilibrium properties depends on all system parameters except fixed 
generation cost; final market price is close to the highest variable cost of GENCO in market. 
• Under price and quantity competition, price/quantity equilibrium, if any, and market power and market 
share depend on all system parameters except the fixed generation cost; 
• Under price and quantity competition, lower marginal cost of a GENCO leads to more market power of 
the GENCO. A more inelastic demand doesn't necessarily give GENCOs more market power; 
• Under price and quantity competition, quantity competition and price competition are correlated. 
GENCOs decisions and market price transitions are generally less dynamic than under quantity 
competitions. 
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• Under price and quantity competition with uncertainty, probability distributions of estimate of other 
GENCO s output change GENCOs' decision making and market properties, Weighted average of 
different estimate to form expectation generally make price dynamics less dynamic; 
Applications of method and models proposed in this work are presented. Multiple electric market dynamics 
connected by transmission networks and energy market consisting of fuel market, electric market and 
consumers, are modeled. These applications shows models developed in this work can be used to study general 
market dynamic problems. 
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7 GENCO DECISION-MAKING IN SHORT-TERM ELECTRIC 
MARKET 
GENCO decision-making is one key factor in short-term electric market dynamics. In previous chapters, 
GENCO decision-making in short-term is represented by basic models to reflect interactions between GENCOs 
under different market organizations and show corresponding market dynamics. In Chapters 7 and 8, decision 
models for GENCOs in short-term electric market are studied in detail to provide tools for GENCOs to make 
production and bidding decision in deregulated market. 
7.1 Chapter overview 
The objective for GENCOs in new deregulated environment is to maximize profit. In short term this means 
to schedule generation and make bidding decisions. All these decisions should be market-based. Both demand 
properties and competitors' actions should be considered because demand for GENCOs is not assured and there 
is fierce competition in market. Bidding strategies should be formed together with generation decisions to make 
sure all decisions are technically and economically feasible and optimal. 
In this chapter, how GENCO should to schedule generation and make bidding decisions in day ahead 
market is shown. After assumptions are made, a one-market, one-period decision-making process is analyzed. 
Next, decision-making in a one-market, two-successive-period environment is discussed. The environment is 
then extended to two-market, one-period and two-market two-period, respectively and corresponding decision­
making processes are studied. Here one period is one hour. Finally, some related issues are discussed. 
7.2 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are used: 
• Buyers of electricity are aggregated and represented by demand for electricity. 
• The market is run by auction. Each GENCO submits a bid and demand is first met by bid with the 
lowest price. If demand is not fully met, bid with second lowest price will be taken, and so on. If there 
are two bids with the same price, demand is divided evenly in them; 
• Competition is price and quantity competition. Electricity from GENCOs is same to consumer. The 
aggregated buyer makes buy-or-not-buy and how-much-to-buy decision based on price. 
• There are two GENCOs, GENCO 1 and GENC02, in market. The problem is seen from GENCOl's 
view to maximize profit. GENC02 can be seen as an aggregation of all other GENCOs in market. 
• Each GENCO has one generator, the composite generator. Cost function and technical constraints on 
the composite generator are composite. 
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7.3 GENCO decision-making in one market in one period 
Assume GENCO 1 has generation quantity and price estimate of demand and competitor's decisions in the 
next period. GENCOl believes the buyer is willing to buy amount qd at a price no more than pd (represented 
by qd @ pd ) and GENC02 wants to sell an amount q2 at the price of p2 (represented by q2 @ p2 ). 
The decision for GENCOs in one market in one period has been discussed in section 6.3. In summary, the 
problem GENCOl needs to solve is 
maximum profit in Case 1 
maximum profit in Case 2 
Max 
Profit in Case 3 
Profit in Case 4 
Case 1: max# = pxqx -Cx(qx) 
p  i . 0 i  
S t .  q x  < q d  ~ q 2 , q  l m i n  < 9 i  ^ q l n a x , P d  > p x > p 2  
Case 2: max Jt = pxqx - C, (qx ) 
St q x  < q d , q x ^  < 4i < P 2 > P ~ i  ^  P d  
Case 3: ÏÏ — 0 
Case 4 Jt(t) = qx(t)px(t) ~cx(qx(t) ) 
St qx(t) = 0.5qd(t) ,qXnin <qx(t) <q lw,px(t) = p2(t) 
Since Case 4 rarely happens, it is not discussed in later discussion. But it should be known that GENCOs have 
such an option. 
7.4 GENCO decision-making in one market in two successive periods 
Suppose GENCOl needs to maximize profit in two successive periods. Time value of money could be 
neglected because GENCOl is making short-term decisions. Assume GENCOl has an estimate of demand and 
decisions for GENC02: GENCOl's forecast for demand in two periods are qdx @ pdx and qd2 @ pd2 ; 
GENCOl's forecast for GENC02 are q2l @ p2l and q22 @ p22. 
Now GENCOl needs to make four decisions in two periods: price and quantities for each of two periods. It 
may bid a higher or lower price than that of GENC02 and there are four combinations of two prices. In the 
meantime, generation quantities in two successive periods are interdependent. There are technical constraints on 
generations in two periods: ramp rate [Wang, 1993], minimum up time, and minimum down time. Different 
start-up and shut-down decisions also influence total profit and should be considered, because GENCOl may 
shut down generator and start it up later or vice versa in two periods. 
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7.4.1 Effects of ramp rate 
Assume q r a m p u p  is the maximum increase of the generation and q r a m p d o w n  is the maximum decrease of 
the generation in two successive periods. Then, qn,ql2 should satisfy 
9l2 —Q11 ~^~Qramp_up> Ql l  ~  ^ 7ll Q ramp _  down 
7.4.2 Effects of minimum up time and minimum down time 
Once a generator is on, it should not be turned off immediately and should be run for at least a Minimum 
Up Time (MUT). Once a generator is turned off, there is a Minimum Down Time (MDT) before it can be turn 
on. Operation of generators must follow these rules. 
7.4.3 Effects of start-up/shut-down cost 
In the first period, if demand is low and price of GENCOl is higher than the price of GENC02, there will 
be either no deal for GENCOl or there may be negative profit if it decides to generate. GENCOl may have to 
shut down its generator in period 1 but still want to generate in period 2 to maximize total profit. Then, it has to 
bear a Shut Down Cost (SDC) and a Start-up Cost (SUC) in the shutdown /startup process. SDC and SUC may 
change total profit and need to be included in the profit maximizing problem. 
When SDC and SUC are taken into account, the profit of GENCOl has four forms, listed in Table 7.1. 
GENCOl needs to compare all possible profits and chooses decisions with the maximum profit. It is assumed 
that at the beginning of period 1, the generator is on. 
Table 7.1 One-market two-successive-period profit maximizing objective 
Case# Period 1 Decision Period 2 Decision Profit 
1 Generate Generate QUPM ~ QnPn ~ ^ 1(^12) 
2 Shut down Start-up& Generate - SDC - SUC + qnpn -C,(<jr12) 
3 Generate Shut down QnPw ~Cx(qu) — SDC 
4 Shut down Off -SDC 
7.4.4 Effects of both ramp rat, MUT/MDT, SDC/SUC 
When effects of the ramp rate, MUT/MDT, and SDC/SUC are considered, objective and constraints of 
profit maximizing problem become complex. The key factor is price and the problem for GENCOl changes as 
price changes. Profit maximizing problems, including objective and constraints, for GENCOl are summarized 
in Table 7.2. GENCOl should analyze all cases and choose decisions with a maximum profit. 
It is assumed that only when GENCOl's price is higher than its competitor, is the shutdown/startup 
considered necessary. If GENCOl's price is lower, usually GENCOl get sufficient demand to make a good 
profit to avoid shutdown/startup and it is unnecessary to consider them. 
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Table 7.2 One-market two-successive-period profit maximizing problems 
Case Pricing strategy 
(also constraints) 
Profit and particular constraints for each case 
1 P u  S f z ,  
Pl2 ~ Pl2 
Max n = qnPu-Cl(,qu) + ql2pn-C,(qn) 
St lu — 4di ' 9l2 — Id! 
2 Pll ^Pll 
P\2 -> P22 
U.3x{n = qupu-C,(%,) + g,2A2-C, (»2)'  
K = Pnln ~Cj(qn)~SDC } 
St. qn <qin,qn ^qd2~1t2 
3 Pu "> f 21 
Pll — P22 
Max{ k = qupu-Cx{qu) + qnpu-Cx(qn) > 
71 — —SDC — SUC + p,2<?i2 ~C\(qn)} 
St
" <7l 1 - — <721 ' 9l2 - Id! 
4 Pu > P21 
P\2 > P22 
Max {n = qnpu-cx(qn) + qi2pn-cx(qx2), 
z = Pn<ln ~C\(4n)~SDC, 
71 — —SDC— SUC+ Pi2<li2~Cl(qn) 
-SDC] 
S L  In 5  1 -«2i '  Î12 5  Id2 -fz: 
Constraints for all cases 
(Price constraints) pu < piX,pn V
I 
(Ramp rate) qn <qu +qramp up '^12 ~  ^ 11 Q ramp _  down 
(Generation limit) qlnin < qu < 9lmax , q]mm < qn < 9lmax 
(MUT/MDT constraints) 
Problem formulations in Table 7.2 are general. It should be noticed that with MUT/MDT constraints, some 
options listed in Table 7.2 may not be feasible. For example, if in the first period the unit is on and MUT is 
greater than one period, in the second period the unit can't be shut down. Specific formulations of a problem 
depend on specific values of MDT/MUT. 
7.5 GENCO decision-making in two markets in one period 
When GENCOs trade in more than one market at the same time and prices in these markets are different, 
GENCOs have more options. They can decide which market its generation should be sold to and how much 
should be charged. 
Suppose there are two markets: a spot market and an ancillary market. GENCOl tries to maximize total 
profit in two markets in one period. Let qx @ px and qal @ pa] be GENCOl s price and quantity of 
electricity in spot market and ancillary market. Assume GENCOl has an estimate of demand and decisions of 
84 
GENC02 in two markets: GENCO 1's forecast for demand in two markets are q d  @ p d  and q a d  @ p a d  ;  
GENCOl ' s  fo recas t  f o r  GENC02  in  two  marke t s  a r e  q 2  @ p 2  and  q a 2  @ p a 2  .  
Now GENCOl needs to make four decisions in two markets: two prices and two quantities. GENCOl may 
bid higher or lower than GENC02 in each market and there are four combinations of two prices. Objectives and 
constraints for GENCOl in different situations are summarized in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 Two-market one-period profit maximizing problems 
Case Pricing strategy 
(also constraints) 
Profit and constraints for each case 
1 P\  ^PnPal  ~  Pal  Max 7t= p x qx - c x (q x +q a x )  +  p a l q a i  
S t  9 ,  ^ q a X  5  q a i  
2 P\  ^  Pi*  Pal  >  Pal  Ma\7C=p x q x  —C x  (q x  +q a X )  +  p a X q a X  
St  9, ^4, '9.1  ^ lad ' la l  
3 P\> Pl 'Pa l^Pal  Max {7t  =  p x q x  — C,(q x  +q a X )  +  p a X q a X  = -SDC } 
S t  1\^<l i -<lV<la \  — ^  ad  
4 Pi  >  Pl> Pat  >  Pal  Max {71 =  p x q x  -C,(q x  +q a X )+P a X q o X ,  71 =  -SDC } 
St
" ^  lad  - ^a i  
Constraints for all cases 
(Price constraints) P i ^ P d  P a i ^ P a d  
(Generation limitation) q l n i n  < q x  < <? l m a x  
(O the r  cons t r a in t  )  ( />{q l  ,q a X )>0 
where <ft (q l ,  q a l  ) is the constraint between quantities in two markets at the same time. For example, for a spot 
market and a reserve market, should be qx +qal <0.85<?Imax • GENCOl needs to consider all four cases and 
choose decisions to maximize total profit in two markets. 
7.6 GENCO decision-making in two markets in two successive periods 
Assume GENCOl tries to maximize total profit in two markets in two successive periods. Suppose there are 
a spot market and an ancillary market. Assume GENCOl has an estimate for demand and GENC02's decisions, 
summarized in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Forecast of demand and GENC02's decisions 
Time Market Demand (quantity @ price) GENC02(quantity @ price) 
1 Spot 
^i@^i *21 @ Pzi 
Ancillary lad l  @  Padl  9o21 ® Pal l  
2 Spot 9^2 @ Pd2 q 2 2  @ p 2 2  
Ancillary 9^2 @ f^2 9.22 @ P.22 
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Let q n  @ p n  and q a U  @ pa)1 be GENCOl's price and quantity in spot market and ancillary market in 
period 1. Let qn @ pn and qaU @ paU be GENCOl's price and quantity in the spot market and ancillary 
market in period 2. The accepted quantities of GENCOl are different if it bids different prices. There are 16 
possible price decision combinations for two markets in two periods. The profit maximizing problems for 
GENCOl can be classified by those pricing strategies. Here, the details of one case are shown in Table 7.5. 
Other cases can be analyzed similarly. 
Table 7.5 An example of pricing strategies and corresponding optimizing problems for GENCOl 
Pricing Strategy ( />„ > p2„ pn > p22, paU < pa2v pal2 < pa22 ) 
Max { 
{Max k= puqn-C,(%, + qa],)+ paX{q„n + pnqX2 -C,(qn + qM) + pal2qM 
St. pu > p2V pi2 > p22, paU < pa2V pal2 < pa22 
#11 — 1d\  ~#21 '#12 — 4d l  ~4 l l ' 1aU — 1ad \  ' 4a \ l  — Qadl  
#12 — #11 #ramp_up  '  #12 — #11 4  ramp _down '  
#lmax — #11 — # 1 min ' # 1 max — #12 — #lmin 
I ,  qa \  1 ) ^ o, <j>(q n  ,q a X 2 )>0,  MUT/MDT constraints}, 
{ Max 7C = pnqu-Cx{qu+qM) + paUqaU-SDC, 
St  Pu  - >  Pi]  '  Pal2  — Pa l l  #11 —1d\  ~#a21>#<.12 — lad!  
#,max 5 #1, — #1 min * ' #aii ) ^  0 • MUT/MDT constraints}, 
{ Max jt = -SDC - SUC + pl2ql2 - C,(ql2 +qan) + pallqan > 
St Pl2  >  Pl l>  Pal l  — Pa l l  #12 — #rf2 _#a22'#ol2 - #orf2 
#,ma, ^ #12 ^ #imin ' #.2 ^ 1ramp_up. ^9,2 ' 1a\2 ) ^ °,MUT/MDT constraints } 
{ Z = —SDC MUT/MDT constraints} 
} 
7.7 Discussion 
Profit maximizing problems in two markets and two successive periods have been studied. The model can 
be easily extended to multi-market, multi-successive-period and this is discussed in Chapter 8. 
The problem addressed in this chapter is a highly non-linear optimization problem. It consists of several 
sub-problems that are also optimization problems. When there are few markets and the time horizon includes 
only a few periods, different sub-problems can be solved separately and the final result can be obtained by 
enumeration. When there are several markets and the time horizon includes several periods, the problem 
becomes so computing extensive that enumeration is not possible. How to solve this problem using Dynamic 
Programming is shown in chapter 8. 
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8 GENCOS DECISION IN SHORT-TERM ELECTRIC MARKET: 
MARKET-BASED GENERATION SCHEDULING 
8.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter studies market-based generation scheduling for GENCOs in short-term electric market (day 
ahead market). How GENCOs should make generation and bidding decisions according to technical constraints 
and market conditions are studied based on results in Chapter 7. The problem is solved using Dynamic 
Programming and numerical examples are provided. 
8.2 Market-based generation scheduling: a three-dimension problem 
As shown in Chapter 7, the objective for GENCOs in new deregulated environment is to maximize profit. 
To succeed in the market, all generation and make bidding decisions should be market-based. Both the demand 
side properties and competitors' actions should be considered. In the meantime, bidding strategies should be 
formed together with generation schedule to make sure all decisions are technically and economically feasible 
and optimal. Traditional Unit Commitment (UC) and Economic Dispatch (ED) algorithms need to be modified 
and integrated with bidding. 
Meanwhile, because of deregulation, all service markets are open to all GENCOs. These markets have 
different market properties including requirements, service quantity, and service prices. GENCOs need to 
allocate generation and other resources to these markets to get the best overall return. Moreover, deregulation 
allows GENCOs to serve loads other than local load. They can enter geographical markets that are far away 
from their generators and sell generations (and other services) if it is profitable to do so. 
In summary, the profit maximizing problem for GENCOs in short-term deregulated electric markets is a 
three-dimension problem: market-based generation scheduling in multiple geographical markets in multiple 
service markets, as shown in Figure 8.1. Each point in the three-dimension space in Figure 8.1 defines a decision 
variable pair for GENCOs: how much generation (or other resources) and how much the price should be in the 
service market in the geographical market at that time. After solving market-based generation scheduling 
problems, GENCOs should have a generation schedule, generation quantity, and prices for each service market 
in each geographical market. The overall total profit for GENCOs is maximized. 
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Service market 
Time 
Geographical 
market 
Figure 8.1 Generation scheduling problem for GENCOs in deregulated environment 
The problem is attacked by solving following problems one by one, based on results from Chapter 7: 
1) Market based generation scheduling in one market, 
2) Market based generation scheduling under uncertainty, 
3) Market based generation scheduling in multiple geographical markets, 
4) Market based generation scheduling in multiple service markets. 
8.3 Market-based generation scheduling in one market 
8.3.1 Introduction 
This section re-examines generation scheduling in one market and proposes a new scheme to implement 
market-based generation scheduling scheme. In the new scheme, generation decision and bidding strategy are 
obtained simultaneously. Since both technical constraints and market conditions are considered, generation and 
bidding decisions are technically and economically feasible. 
8.3.2 Proposed scheme 
Assume the market is operated by auctions, and future demand and competitors' actions (both price and 
quantity) are known to GENCOs by forecast. The objective is to find optimal generation amount for each unit 
and bid price in each period to maximize total profit. 
In (8.1), 71 is total profit, 7li is profit in period i, p, is the accepted price in period i, q, is the accepted quantity 
in period i (also generation amount because electricity can not be stored), c,( ) is the generation cost, TC(, ) is 
the transition cost when the output changes from to q, (including start-up cost, shut down cost, and banking 
cost). 
(8-1) 
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Constraints for this problem include: 
• Capacity constraints for generators: < qt < , 
• Generator ramp rate constraints: q i  < q,_ x  + q R a m p U p  ,  q ,  >  +  q R a m p D o w n  ,  
• Generator minimum up time and generator minimum down time constraints. 
Some conventional constraints for generation scheduling, such as load balance constraints, are not included 
because they are not valid in new environments. 
8.3.3 Solving market-based generation scheduling using Dynamic Programming 
The new market based generation scheduling scheme is similar to traditional UC algorithms. UC has been 
attacked by Dynamic Programming [Hobbs, 1988][Siu, 2001][0uyang, 1991], Lagrange relaxation [Wang, 
1995][Li, 1998], evolutionary algorithm [Kazarlis, 1996] [Richter, 2000] and other methods [Li, 1993][Li, 
1997] [Madrigal, 1999] [Li, 1999]. 
The new problem is a typical multi-stage multi-state decision problem. Dynamic programming (DP) is a 
good way to solve this kind of problem[Bellman, 1957] [Bather, 2000] and have been widely adopted in 
traditional UC solutions. Now the market-based generation scheduling problem is to be solved by DP. 
8.3.3.1 Definitions in Dynamic Programming 
First of all, as required by DP, the stage and state of the problem need to be defined. For this problem, stage 
is defined as each period (hour). State is defined as the combinations of maximum generation that could be 
provided by all units in different working modes during and after startup processes. For a problem of M- period 
profit maximization with N unit (each has L, startup/shut down ramping hours), there are M stages and 
N 
(L{ +1) states. For example, assume there are three units, each of which has a minimum up/down time of 2 
i=i 
hours. The ramp rates for units 1, 2, and 3 are 50, 60, 70 MW, respectively. The maximum outputs are 100, 120, 
and 140 MW, respectively. Then, working modes for three units are: 
Unit 1: Al A2 A3 (0 50 100), Unit 2:B1 B2 B3 (0 60 120), Unit 3: CI C2 C3 (0 70 140) 
States for the three-unit market-based generation scheduling problem are shown in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 An example for definition of "State" 
State A1B1C1 A1B1C2 A1B1C3 A1B2C1 A1B2C2 A1B2C 
3 
A1B3C 
1 
A1B3C2 A1B3C 
3 
Maximum 
output 
0 70 140 60 130 200 120 190 260 
State A2B1C1 A2B1C2 A2B1C3 A2B2C1 A2B2C2 A2B2C 
3 
A2B3C 
1 
A2B3C2 A2B3C 
3 
Maximum 
output 
50 120 190 110 180 250 170 240 310 
State A3B1C1 A3B1C2 A3B1C3 A3B2C1 A3B2C2 A3B2C 
3 
A3B3C 
1 
A3B3C2 A3B3C 
3 
Maximum 
output 
100 170 240 160 230 300 220 290 360 
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Conventional definition of "state" in UC using DP is online/offline status combination of units. The 
problem with this definition is that statuses of generation units are not uniquely represented [Hobbs, 1988]. For 
example, traditional state "100" for the above examples means that unit 1 is online and the other two are offline. 
However, how much generation unit 1 can produce is unknown without further information—how long this unit 
has been online—because of ramp rate constraint in start-up process. If unit 1 has been online for 1 hour, it can 
generate up to 50MW; but if it has been online for 2 hours or more, it may generate up to 100MW. The new 
definition solves this problem by including all unit working modes into state definition. 
With new definition, solving a problem using DP has more states than the conventional definition and may 
need more computing time. However, with current computing facilities, this is not a significant problem. 
Moreover, the new definition can find the optimal profit maximizing solution—which is the most important goal 
in new environment. 
8.3.3.2 Problem formulation for Dynamic Programming 
The objective is to maximize the profit in the M stages and the objective function is . 
fm = raax(jr t  - TC(i -1, i) + ) (8.2) 
In (8.2), fM is the total profit from stage 1 to stage M, TC(i-l,i) is the transition cost from the state i-1 to i, 
is the profit from market activities (bidding) at state i. 7Ti should be the maximum profit of different bidding 
strategies, which are optimization problems: 
7Cj — max(xniïi2,xi3) 
xn = max(p,4, - c(g, )) St. p i  < pci, q( < qdi 
JC i2 = max{p iq i  - c(q i  )) St. pdi > p t  > pci, q, < qdi - qci 
= 
0 
where qci is the bidding quantity of the competitor, pci is the bidding price of the competitor, qdi is the demand 
quantity, and pdi is the demand price (the highest price demand is willing to offer for qdl). 
The constraints between the different states and stages include: 
• Capacity constraints: q^ < q i  < q^ , 
• Ramp rate constraints: q, = > lu ~ 9,-u - iRompUpj - 9,y " 9,_ij RompDownj • 
j 
where q : j  is the output of unit j at stage i, qRampUpj is the ramp up rate of unit), qRampDownj is the ramp 
down rate of unit j. 
• Generator minimum up time and generator minimum down time constraints. 
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8.3.3.3 A numerical example 
Assume a GENCO has two units and needs to schedule generations for next 12 hours. Working modes are: 
(0, 75,180) for both units. Other unit parameters are shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Generator parameters 
Generator 1 2 
Pmin(MW) 0 0 
Pmax(MW) 180 180 
a(constant) 58.25 138.51 
b(linear) 8.287 7.955 
c(quadratic) 7.62e-6 3.05e-5 
Bank cost($) 192 223 
Start cost(S) 443 441 
Stop cost($) 750 750 
Min up time(hour) 2 2 
Min down time(hour) 2 2 
Demand and competitor forecasting are shown in Table 8.3. The competitor's generation is set as 0.55qd 
and the competitor's price is set as 0.85pd. 
Table 8.3 Demand and competitor forecast 
Hour Load 
forecast(MWh) 
Price 
forecast($/MWh) 
Competitor 
Forecast(MWh) 
Competitor 
price($/MWh) 
1 285 25.87 156.75 21.9895 
2 293 23.06 161.15 19.601 
3 267 19.47 146.85 16.5495 
4 247 18.66 135.85 15.861 
5 295 21.38 162.25 18.173 
6 292 12.46 160.6 10.591 
7 299 9.12 164.45 7.752 
8 328 8.88 180.4 7.548 
9 326 9.12 179.3 7.752 
10 298 8.88 163.9 7.548 
11 267 25.23 146.85 21.4455 
12 293 26.45 161.15 22.4825 
The optimal generation schedule for GENCOl is shown in Table 8.4. 
Dynamic programming is an effective way to solve the problem. Several cases with different ramp time and 
scheduling hours have been solved by DP and enumeration. The running time for these cases is shown in Table 
8.5. It can be seen that DP could find optimal solutions with much less time as schedule time increases. When 
DP is used, the computing time is linear to the scheduling time (the number of hours that generation needs to be 
scheduled). The computing time for enumeration, however, increases exponentially at the base of state number. 
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Table 8.4 Optimal generation schedule 
unit 1 unit2 
Hours output (MW) output (MW) price Hourly profit 
1 53.25 75 25.87 2082.97 
2 145 145 19.6 3131.35 
3 87 180 16.55 2068.18 
4 67 180 15.86 1732.51 
5 115 180 18.17 2777.4 
6 112 180 10.59 534.4 
7 134.55 0 9.12 53.7 
8 145.6 0 8.87 26.05 
9 144.7 0 9.12 62.13 
10 134.1 0 8.88 21.13 
11 87 180 21.45 3375.41 
12 113 180 22.49 4023.39 
Total profit is 19152.27 
Table 8.5 Case running time comparison 
Case Hours Ramping DP Computing time Enumeration time DP found optimal 
hours (seconds) (seconds) solutions? 
1 5 3 572 151 Yes 
2 6 3 760 2015 Yes 
3 14 3 870 lelO(estimated) Should have 
8.4 Market-based generation scheduling under uncertainty 
Uncertainty exists in GENCOs' forecast of demand and competitors' actions. The model described in 
section 8.3 is modified to maximize the expected profit with consideration of uncertainty. 
Generally speaking, load demand (both price and quantity) can be relatively accurately determined and a 
competitor's actions (including bidding prices and quantity) are more difficult to predict. In this section, only the 
uncertainty associated with competitors' action is considered. Uncertainty associated with demand can be 
included in the model similarly. 
8.4.1 Assumptions 
Assume GENCOl needs to determine generation and bidding prices for the next M hours. Assume the 
distributions of competitors' output action in each stage are independent and for each hour j there are two 
possible cases of competitor actions. The first one has a probability of yOy to be true and the second one has the 
probability of 1 — pj. The forecast of demand and competitor's action are shown in Table 8.6. 
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Table 8.6 Forecast of demand and competitor 
Stage (Hour) j =1,2,...M 
Case 1 | 2 
Demand price Pdi 
Demand quantity % 
Competitor demand Pcj Pci 
Competitor quantity Ici 1c, 
Probability Pi 1 - P ,  
8.4.2 Solving the problem using Stochastic Dynamic Programming 
Stochastic Dynamic Programming is a branch of dynamic programming. It is an efficient way to solve 
problems of sequential decision-making with risk and uncertainty [Bather, 2000], [Bertsekas, 1976], [Puterman, 
1978]. Stochastic Dynamic Programming is used to solve the market-based generation scheduling problem with 
uncertainty. 
Stage and state definitions are the same as those in section 8.2. The total expected profit in the M stages is 
fM  = max E[(km —TC(State(M —\) ,s tate{M))  + fM_ x  ) ]  
= max[E(#, - TC(State(M -1),1) + fM_ x  ) ,  
E{n 2  -  TC(State(M -1),2) + 
E{7t t  —TC(State(M — l ) , i )  +  fM_ { ) ,  
E { tcN  -  T C (State( M  - 1 ) ,  N )  + fM_ x  ) ]  
In (8.3), fM is the total expected profit from stage 1 to stage M. £(^;) is the expected generation and bidding 
profit at stage M with the unit state i, TC(State(M-l), i ) is the transition cost from the state in stage M-l to state i 
in stage M. fM.j is the profit from all stages before stage M. 
E(lt^) should be the maximum expected profit in two possible cases: 
max E{7t l  )  =  {p s7l t X  + (1 -  />,  )Jt i 2  )  
Pji, 
Where 7ta is the profit in easel for given Pj,<ij. ^i2 is the profit in case2 for given • Since the profit 
is determined by auction, the expected profit maximizing problem is nonlinear. Although this problem can be 
solved by enumeration by calculating expected profit for all feasible price and quantity combinations, it is too 
computing extensive. Now, the problem is to be divided into several sub problems based on different price 
s t ra teg ies ,  which  a re  easy  to  so lve  respec t ive ly .  Assume p c j  < p' c j ,  q c j  < q' c j .  
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If pj  < p c j  < p d j ,  in both easel and case2, GENCOl can sell up to q d j .  Then the expected profit 
maximizing problem is 
ma xE(n t )  = ma xQjjÇj  -c iq/))  St. Pj < pC J  < p dj,qt < qdj 
If p' c j  < pj  < p d J , in easel GENCOl can sell up to q d j  -  q c j . In case2 it can sell up to q d j  -  q' c j .  So, it 
can sell qdj — q'cj in both cases. The expected profit maximizing problem is 
max£(#,.) = max(p^ - c(^)) St., p' c j  < Pj  < p d j ,  q t  < q d j  -  q' c j  
When we set p'cj < Pj < pdj andqdj -qcj > q. > q d j  -q' c j , in easel, GENCOl can sell . But in case2, 
GENCOl can only sell qdj -q cj. Assume GENCOl can sell extra generation at price 0 (because it generate 
more than accepted quantity in case2.) The expected profit maximization problem becomes 
maxE(tc , ) = max[/?;.{p ]q ]  -c(^) )  + (!-p,)(Pj(q d )  -q'C J  ) -c(qj))]  
pj.ij 
st.! p'c j< Pj  ^  pd j ,  qd J  -q'ej^q, <qd j  ~qC J  
If p c j  < Pj  < p' c j , in easel GENCOl can sell up to q d j  — q c ] .  In case2 it can sell up to q d j . So, it can at 
least sell qdj — qcj. The expected profit maximizing problem is 
maxE{n t  )  =  max(p ]q ]  -  c(^)) St. p c j  <Pj< p'C J ,  q }  < q d j  -  q c j  
When we set p c J  < Pj  < p' c j  andqdj>— q c j< q} < q d j , in case 2 GENCOl can sell q} . But in case 1 
GENCOl can only sell qdj - qcj. qdj - q'cj. Assume GENCOl can sell extra generation at price 0. The expected 
profit maximization problem becomes 
maxE (k i) = max[/9; (p .(q d j -q c j )~c(q } ) )  + (!-p,)(p ;q,  ~c(qj)]  
Pj.ij 
St- Pg < P, ^ ^ 9; ^ 9# 
In summary, the expected profit maximizing problem for GENCOl at each state i is shown in Figure 8.2. It 
can be seen that all feasible combination of price and quantity are covered so the optimal solution can be found. 
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max) 
maxE(n t )  = max(p.g. -c iq/))  St. p }  < p c j  < p d j  , qj < q d j  
max{ max E(lt i  ) = maM p f l j  ~ c ( q j  )) 
St.. P'd< 3 p*. 
maxE{7t i ) = max[/>;(p Jq J  -c(qj))  + (!-p } )(p. (q d j  -q'C J  ) -
pj . i j  ~ c ( q j ) ) ]  
St.. j,',, < ^  < ^  ^  < 9* } 
max{ max E{n i  ) = m ,àx(p jq ]  -  c(qj))  
maxE(n i )  = max[p.( p j (q d ]  -q c j ) -c(qj))  + (!-p }K p ^ j  
pj . i j  ~ c { q j ) ]  
St- P c j  < P j  Z  P'cj  .  *4 ~<lcj^ 1j  ^  Qdj  }  }  
Figure 8.2 Expected profit maximizing problem in auction at each state 
The constraints between the different states and stages include: 
• Capacity constraints : qm n  < q i  < , 
• Ramp rate constraints: q,  = . <7,y ~ 9,_ij ^ iRampUpj > l i j  ~  Vi- i j  ^RampUm* -
j  
where q t j  is the output of unit j at stage i, qRampUpj is the ramp up rate of unit;, qRampDownj is the ramp 
down rate of unit j .  
• Generator minimum up time and generator minimum down time. 
Now, the market-based probabilistic generation scheduling problem for GENCOs could be solved by 
Stochastic Dynamic Programming. The procedures are given in Figure 8.3. 
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Step 1. Problem initialization. 
Step 2. Compute expected profit from the initial state io to technically feasible state i : 
fi = TC (iO, i) + 7ti. 
Find the optimal generation output and bidding decisions from the initial state to the 
first stage. Store the best expected profit and the best state transition path 
(generation output for each unit and pricing decisions). 
Find the optimal generation output and pricing decisions for each technically feasible 
s ta te  o f  the  cur rent  s tage j  us ing opt imal  resu l ts  f rom the prev ious  s tage j - 1 .  
fj = max E[(zi - TC(State(j -1), i) + fH )] 
If j  =  M ,  go to step 6. 
j  =  j  +1, go to step 3. 
Trace the optimal state transition path. Output generation amount for each unit and 
price in all stages. 
Figure 8.3 Procedures for market-based probabilistic generation scheduling by SDP 
8.4.3 A numerical example 
A numerical example is shown below. Assume a GENCO has two units and schedules generations for next 
6 hours. All generator parameters are the same as those in section 8.3.3.3. The forecast of demand and the 
competitor's actions is shown in Table 8.7. 
Table 8.7 Probabilistic forecast of demand and competitor 
Hour id 
(MWh) 
Pd 
($/MWh) 
Competitor forecasting 
Case 1 @ probability 0.4 Case 2 @ probability 0.6 
qc (MWh) pr ($/MWh) qc (MWh) pc ($/MWh) 
1 285 25.87 156.75 21.99 199.5 23.28 
2 293 23.06 161.15 19.601 205.1 20.75 
3 267 19.47 146.85 16.55 186.9 17.52 
4 247 18.66 135.85 15.861 172.9 16.79 
5 295 21.38 162.25 18.173 206.5 19.24 
6 292 12.46 160.6 10.591 204.4 11.21 
In case 1, the competitor's generation is set as 0.55^rf. The competitor's price is set as 0.85pd In case 2, the 
competitor's generation is set as 0.7qd. The competitor's price is set as 0.9pd. 
The final optimal probabilistic market-based generation schedule is shown in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8 Optimal probabilistic market-based generation schedule 
Hours Unitl Unit2 price Profit 
1 75 75 21.925 1873.599 
2 145 145 19.543 3114.92 
3 123.25 145 16.501 2053.982 
4 101.5 145 15.814 1706.152 
5 145 145 18.12 2702.018 
6 145 145 10.56 509.705 
Final expected profit is 11350.42 
Step 3. 
Step 4. 
Step 5. 
Step 6. 
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8.4.4 Discussion 
In this section, uncertainty in competitor' actions in different time are assumed fixed and independent and 
don't change with the action taken by decision-making GENCOs. A simplified Stochastic Dynamic 
Programming is applied in this section. This is because in short term market, uncertainty market may not be 
extremely volatile and uncertainty in different stages can be represented well enough by independent fixed 
distribution function. Such a modeling of uncertainty can avoid complex modeling and illustrate the idea of 
Dynamic Programming in solving the problem. Oversimplification of operation constraints (startup/shutdown 
time, startup/shutdown cost) can be avoided and the model is realistic enough. A similar problem, generation 
plant evaluation with consideration of operation constraints, is modeled in [Deng, 2002]. Many simplifications 
on GENCO operation constraints have to be made to build a stochastic decision model and the model is not as 
practical as desired. 
Uncertainty of demand and competitor's decision can also be modeled as stochastic process and 
probabilistic distributions of them can be dependent on GENCOs decisions. However, this will not change the 
model radically. 
8.5 Market-based generation scheduling for multiple geographical markets 
GENCOs may want to maximize their total profit in more than one market. These markets are assumed 
located in different geographical areas and are connected by transmission networks. 
8.5.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
• There are two separated markets-market 1 and market2-connected by a transmission network. 
GENCOl is in market 1. 
• ATC (Available Transmission Capacity) from market 1 to market2 is known. 
• Forecast of demand is known in two markets (both price and quantity). 
• Forecast of competitors' actions in two markets is known (both price and quantity). 
Such a market environment is shown in Figure 8.4. The problem is seen from GENCOl's point of view to 
find generation schedule to maximize total profit in two markets. 
8.5.2 Problem formulation 
GENCOl s objective is to find optimal generation scheduling and bidding strategies to maximize the total 
profit in two markets in several periods. 
max i t  =  Y J Jf( i )  = £[/>, (:)9i (0 + p 2  ( i)q2 (0 - c, 0?i (0 +12 (0) 
i 1 
-TC(q l  ( i  - l )  + q 2  (z -1), q x  ( i )  +  q 2  ( i ) )—TFC{q 2  (z))] 
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GENCOl 
Demand Demand 
Market 1 Market 2 
Figure 8.4 Two geographical electric markets available to GENCOl 
where 7t is the total profit; 7C(i) is the profit in period z; pt(i) and p2(i) are the accepted prices in period i in 
market 1 and 2 qi(i) and q2(i) are the accepted quantities in period i in market 1 and 2 (also generation amount in 
period i because electricity can not be stored); c( ) is generation cost; TC( ) is the transition cost in two periods 
when the total output change from q,(i-l) + q2(i-l) to qt(i)+ q2(i), including the startup cost, shutdown cost, and 
banking cost. TFC() is the transmission cost. 
Constraints for this problem include 
• capacity constraints: q^ < q x  (i) + q 2  ( i )  <  q^ ; 
• Ramp rate constraints: q i  = ;  ,  q t j  -  qM J  < qR a m p U p j ,  q , ,  ~  RampDownj -
j 
• generator minimum up time and generator minimum down time constraints; 
• Transmission constraints: q 2  ( i )  ^  ATC(i) .  
8.5.3 Solving the problem by Dynamic Programming 
Stage and state definitions are the same as those in section 8.2. The new objective function is 
fm = max(^ -  TC(i  -1, i) + /M_, ) 
where fM is the total profit from period 1 to period M, Jti is the profit from market activities. Jti should be the 
optimal result of different bidding strategies. 
K i  = maxOr,., /ri2, , i t i i t  )  
where 7CiX 7ti2, 7Tj3, and.7TiA are defined in Table 8.9. 
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Table 8.9 Profit maximizing problems for two geographical markets 
xn = max(p, (z')g, (z) + p2 (i)q2 (z) - c(g, (z) + ç2 (z)) - rFC(92 (:))) 
St. p,(0 < pcl (0,9,(0 ^  q d i ( i ) , P 2 ( i )  <  p c 2 ( i ) , q 2 ( i ) < q d 2 ( i ) , q 2 ( i )  <  A T C ( i )  
9min ^9l(0 + 92(0^^m« 
^,2 = rnax(p, (t')9, (0 + P 2  (0q2 (0 - c ( q x  ( i )  +  q 2  (0) - T F C ( q 2  (z'))) 
st p,(0 < pcl (0,9, (0 ^  (0,p2(0 > Pc20'),92(0 ^  ^ 2(0-^2(0^2(0 ^  A7C(Z) 
9min ^,(0 + Ç20')^max 
^,-3 = max(p, (0?, (0 + P2 (092 (0 ~ c(9, (0 + ?2 (0) - TFC(g2 (0)) 
st. p, (0 > pc1 (0, 9, (0 ^  9dl (0 - qci (0, P2 (0 < Pd (0, <y2 (0 ^  %,2 (0, q2 (0 ^  Arc(0 
9mi„ ^9,(0 + 92(0^9max 
^,•4 = max(p,( i ) q l (0 +  p 2 ( i ) q 2 ( i )  - c ( q 1 ( i )  +  q 2 (0) - T F C ( q 2 ( / ) ) )  
St. /?,(/) > pcl (0,9,0) 5 9di(0-9ci(0,p2(') > Pel (0,q2 (0 ^  9rf2(0 - 9c2 (0,92(0 ^  ArC(z') 
9min ^9,(0 + 92(0^9max 
In Table 8.9, gt/(i) and qc2(i) are the bidding quantities of competitors in period i in two markets; pcI(i) and pc2(ij 
are the bidding prices of competitors in period i in two markets; qn(i) and qd2(ij are the quantities of demand in 
period i in two markets; Pdi(i) and pd2(i)are the prices of the demand in period i in two markets. 
With such formulation, the problem can be solved by Dynamic Programming. 
8.5.4 Discussion 
When there is transmission limitation between two markets, it is possible to utilize the transmission 
limitation to prevent competitors to enter certain markets. But it may not be always optimal for GENCOs from 
the viewpoint of maximizing total profit. The algorithm developed in this work will automatically find the 
strategy to block competitor if it is profitable by setting ATC(i) as maximum ATC available. 
8.6 Market-based generation scheduling for multiple service markets 
Assume now GENCOs want to maximize total profit in more than one service markets. These markets are 
running at the same time but service in each market is different (such as spot market and reserve market) with 
different demands, costs, and prices. 
8.6.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
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• There are two service markets; 
• Forecast of the demand in both markets are known (both price and quantity); 
• Forecast of competitors' actions in both markets are known (both price and quantity). 
Such an environment for GENCOl is shown in Figure 8.5. 
GENCOl 
Demand 2 Demand 1 
Competitors 2 Competitors 1 
Market 2 Market 1 
Figure 8.5 Two service markets available to GENCOl 
8.6.2 Problem formulation 
The objective is to find the optimal generation scheduling and bidding strategies to maximize total profit in 
two service markets. 
7C = ]T;r(z) = £[/», (i)9i (i) + p2 (i)q2 (z) - c,. (<?, (z), qz (z)) 
I i 
-  TC(q l  (z -1), q 2  (z -1), q x  (z), q 2  ( / ) ) ]  
where # is the total profit; 71 (i) is the profit in period i; pi(i) and p2(i) are the accepted prices in period i in 
market 1 and market2; qi(i) and q2(i) are the accepted quantity in period i in market 1 and market2; c( ) is the 
composite cost function for all service markets; TC( ) is the transition cost in two periods when the output 
change from q,(i-l),q2(i-l) to q,(i), q2(i). 
Constraints for this problem include 
• Capacity constraints: q^n < <?, (z) + q2 (z) < q^ ; 
• Ramp rate constraints: q t  = j , qtJ - q^j < qRampUpj, qtj ~ 9,_u ^qRampDownJ : 
j  
• Generator minimum up time and minimum down time constraints. 
8.6.3 Solving the problem by Dynamic Programming 
The stage and state definitions are the same as those in section 8.2. The new objective function is 
fm = max(^, .  -  TC(i  -1 ,  i )  +  /M_,  )  
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where fM is the total profit from period 1 to period M, 7ti is the profit from market activities (bidding). 7Ci 
should be the optimal result of the different bidding strategies. 
=max(xnx.2,zi3,xi4) 
where 7ZiX Kn, 7Cn, aridity are defined in Table 8.10. 
Table 8.10 Profit maximizing problems for two service markets 
n i X  = max(p, ( ï )q x  (z) + p2 (i )q 2  ( i )  -  c(q x  ( i ) ,  q 2  ( / ) ) )  
St. p x  (z) < p c X  ( i ) ,q x  (z) < q i X  ( i ) ,  p 2  ( i)  < p c 2  ( i ) ,q 2  (z) < q d 2  (z) 
4mi„ ^9i0') + g2(0^gmax 
^",•2 = max(p, (z)ç, (z) + p2 (z')ç2 (z) - c(q x  (z), g2 (z))) 
St. p, (z) < pcl (z),g,(z) < q d X  (i ),p 2  (z) > pc2(;),q 2 (z) < gd2(z) -q c 2  (z) 
9min ^^(0 + 920')^9ma, 
^,•3 = max(p, ( j )q x  (z) + p2 (z')g2 (/) - c(g, (z), q 2  ( / ) ) )  
St.  p ,  ( !) > pcX (i),qx (!) < (!) - tfcl (z), p2 (!) < pc2 (z), (!) < 9d2 0') 
Qmin ^l(0 + 92(0^9max 
^,•4 = max(p, (z')<7, (z) + p2 (z')g2 (z) - c(<?, (z), q2 (z))) 
St. p,(z) > p c X (z),g,(z) <q d x ( i )~q c x (:),p2(z) > p c 2 (z),q 2 (i) <q d 2 (z)-?c2(z) 
9mi. <^0') + g2(0^9max 
In Table 8.10 where q ci(i) and are the bidding quantities of the competitor in period t in two markets; pci(i) 
and pc2(i) are the bidding prices of the competitor in period i in two markets; qdl(i and qd2(i) are the quantities of 
the demand in period i in two markets; pdi(i) and pd2(i) are prices of the demand in period i in two markets. 
With such a formulation, the problem can be solved by Dynamic Programming. 
8.6.4 Discussion 
It should be noticed that the cost function in the new problem is different from the original generation cost 
because the new cost function should be the cost of all services. The new cost function should be composite. 
8.7 Market-based generation scheduling for multiple geographical and service markets 
Assume now GENCOs want to maximize total profit in two geographical markets in two service markets. 
These markets are running at the same time but services in service market in each geographical market are 
different. 
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8.7.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made. 
• There are two geographical markets, each of which has two service markets. 
• Forecast of the demand in all markets are known (both price and quantity). 
• Forecast of competitors' actions in both markets are known (both price and quantity). 
Such an environment for GENCOl is shown in Figure 8.6. 
Geographical 
Market 2 
Geographical 
Market 1 
Service 
market 
Service 
market 
Service 
market 
Service 
market 
ENCOl 
Competitor 
Transmission 
network 2 
Transmission 
network 1 
Figure 8.6 Different markets available to GENCOl 
8.7.2 Problem formulation 
The objective is to find the optimal generation scheduling and bidding strategies to maximize the total profit 
for a certain time in all markets. 
i t  = Yjc (0 = Xtoi ('ten (0 + Pa (0^,2 (0 + Pu d)q 2i (0 + P22 (0q22 (0 
r i 
- c(q,, (z), q i 2  (i), q 2 , (;), 9% (0) 
-TC(qn  ( /  -1), q 1 2  ( i  -1), q 2 l  ( i  -1), q 2 2  ( i  -1), q x , (;), q ] 2  (0 , (0 ,9 2 2  (0 )  
-  TFC(q l ,  ( i ) ,  q l 2  ( i ) ,  q 2 l  (i), q 2 2  ( ; ) ) ]  
where 71 is the total profit; 7t(i) is the profit in period z; pJk(i) are the accepted prices in period i in market j in 
service market k ; qjk(i) are the accepted quantity in period i in market j in service market k ; c() is the composite 
cost function for all service markets; TC( ) is the transition cost in two periods when the output change from 
q,,(i-l),ql2(i-l),q2i(i-1 ),q22(i-l) to qn(i),q12(i),q2](i),q22(i). TFC () is the transmission cost. 
Constraints for this problem include 
• Capacity constraints qm n  < qn ( i )  + q l 2 ( i )  +  q 2 [ ( i )  +  q 2 2 ( i )  < q^ ; 
• Composite ramp rate constraints 
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9l 1 (0 + 9l2 (0 + 921 (0 + 922 0) ~ 9, 1 (i - 1) - 9,2 0 -1)-#21 (0 ~~ 922 (0 - 9Romp(/p 
9i 1 (0 + 9.2 (0 + 921 (0 + 922 (0 - 9i 1 0' -1) - 9i2 0' -1) - 921 (0 - 922 (0 * qRampDown ; 
• Generator minimum up time and minimum down time constraints; 
• Transmission constraints: qn ( i )  + q i :  ( i )  <  ATC )  (i), 
92,(0 + 922(0^ATQ(,). 
8.7.3 Solving the problem using Dynamic Programming 
The stage and state definitions are the same as those in section 8.2. The new objective function is 
fm = max(^, .  -TC(i-1, i )  + 
where fM is the total profit from period 1 to period M, 71 i is the profit from market activities. 7Ci should be the 
optimal result of the different bidding strategies in two service markets in two geographical markets. 
7£, — max^Tj, ^ri2,..., ^ r,15, 7Vjl6 ) 
where Kn  7C i2,...,7tn5,7t i {6  are maximum profit that GENCOl can get with different strategies in different 
markets. 7Ca in which pricing strategy is (low, low, low, high ) in ( market 11, market 12, market 21, market 
22) is shown below. 
Xi2 = Pll  0')9ll (0 + P\2 0)9,2 (0 + Pl\ 0)921 (0 + Pl2 (0922 (0 ~ <^9,1 (0,9,2 (0,921 (0,922(0) 
-rfC(9„(0,9,2(0,92,(0,922(0) 
St. p,,0)<p c n ( i ) ,qn{ i )<q d n(0,P l2(0<  PcX1  (0,9,2(0^9dl2(0 
Pu (0 < Pc2i (0, 921 (0 £ qd21 (0. P 22 (0 > Pc2 (0, 922 (0 ^  9^22 (0 " -9c22 (0 
9,1 (0 + 9,2 (0 £ Arc, (0,921 (0 + 922 (0 ^  atc2 (I), 
9 min ^9, ( 0  +  92 ( 0 ^9max 
With such a formulation, the three-dimension problem discussed in section 8.1 can be solved by Dynamic 
Programming. A market-based generation schedule for GENCOl, with price and quantity bid for each service 
market in each geographical market can be obtained. 
It is easy to extend the model to take into account of uncertainty in estimate of market demand and 
competitors, as shown in section 8.4. Then, the problem needs to be solved by Stochastic Dynamic 
Programming. The procedures to use SDP to solve the three-dimension market-based generation scheduling 
problem for GENCOs, is shown in Figure 8.7. 
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Step 1. Problem initialization. 
Step 2. Compute expected profit from the initial state i0 to technically feasible state / : 
fi = TC (iO, i) + Jti. 
Find the optimal generation output and bidding decisions from the initial state to the 
first stage for each geographical market and each service market. Store the best 
expected profit and the best state transition path (generation output for each unit and 
pricing decisions). 
Step 3. Find the optimal generation output and pricing decisions for each technically feasible 
state of the current stage j using optimal results from the previous stage j-1. 
fj = maxE[{Ki -TC(State(j-1),i) + )] 
Step 4. If j = M, go to step 6. 
Step 5. j=j+1, go to step 3. 
Step 6. Trace the optimal state transition path. Output generation amount for each unit and 
price for each geographical market and service market in all stages. 
Figure 8.7 Procedures to solve market-based probabilistic generation scheduling problem by SDP 
8.7.4 Discussion 
Again, it should be noticed that the cost of service in the new problem is different from the generation 
production cost because the new cost should be the composite cost of all services while the cost for different 
services are different. 
Transaction fees may be included in the model by adding a cost to the objective function-profit calculation 
equation. A large transaction fee will certainly change GENCOs decisions. 
8.8 Chapter summary 
Market-based generation scheduling problems under certainty or uncertainty, in different geographical 
markets, and in different service markets are studied. With solution of these problems, the ultimate problem, 
generation and bidding decisions under uncertainty in multiple service markets in multiple geographical markets 
to maximize total expected profit, can be solved. 
In this chapter, uncertainty in demand properties and competitor' actions in different time are assumed 
independent and fixed and don't change with the action taken by decision-making GENCOs. This is valid in 
short-term market since GENCOs' output won't significantly change market situations and estimate of market 
situation is less uncertain than in long term. Fixed probabilistic estimate gives GENCOs enough ability to 
manage market risk in short term. Meanwhile, oversimplification of operation constraints can be avoided. 
Uncertainty of demand and competitor's decision can also be modeled as stochastic process and probabilistic 
distributions of them may be changed by GENCOs' decisions. Then, a stochastic distribution function which is 
dependent on GENCOs' actions must be used for demand and competitor's action and the problem should be 
solved by full Stochastic Dynamic Programming. 
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Market-based generation scheduling is modeled as an optimization problem for GENCOs in this chapter. 
The problem can also be seen as a stochastic dynamic decision-making problem for GENCO, as shown in Figure 
8.8. Here xs is output of units, actions a, is to decease or increase unit output, C; is profit from operation and 
market activities, and r, is uncertain factor. 
Xn-1 XN X2 XI 
Figure 8.8 Dynamic decision-making process for GENCOs 
The market-based generation scheduling problem then becomes a stochastic control problem for GENCOs 
to find the optimal control scheme 7t(xj to maximize total gain which is a function of c0,CI, ...,cN_i. Now x, is 
the state variable, aj and n is the input variable, q is the output variables, as shown in Figure 8.9. 
Figure 8.9 GENCO Decision-making as a stochastic control problem 
Such control model for GENCOs decision-making process may be put into market models developed in 
Chapter 3-6 to simulate GENCOs decision and market dynamics. The problem for ICA then becomes an optimal 
control problem to achieve predefined market properties. 
In this chapter, decision-making processes of GENCO are discussed in short term. The model can be 
extended to long-term by changing short-term objective to long-term objective (long-term net present value 
maximization) and short-term constraints to long-term constraints (long-term financing constraints, long-term 
generation expansion constraints, etc). 
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9 OVERVIEW OF GENCO LONG-TERM DECISIONS IN NEW 
ENVIRONMENT 
9.1 Chapter overview 
GENCO short-term decision and corresponding electric market dynamics have been studied. Similarly, 
GENCO long-term decision models for generation capacity expansion and resulted electric market dynamics can 
be examined using the same method. In this chapter, GENCOs' decisions in long term are compared with those 
in short term. Method to study GENCOs long-term decisions is suggested. 
9.2 General procedures for long-term capacity expansion 
GENCOs' decision in long term is capacity expansion. Generally, it consists of the following procedures 
[Grigsby, 2001]: 
1. Demand analysis. Demand is predicted for the future time periods to maintain operation physically and 
financially. 
2. Risk analysis. Risks associated with each project and demand-forecast uncertainty is estimated. Value 
at risk acceptable for GENCO is defined and calculated. The methods of reducing risk are identified 
and evaluated. 
3. Objective optimization. The project cost, or net present value (or other objective of the planning entity 
to optimize) for the expansion projects is estimated and optimized. 
4. Final decision. The overall portfolio of projects, contracts, strategies, and risk are assessed. 
9.3 Comparison of GENCO short-term and long-term decisions 
9.3.1 Similarity between GENCO short-term and long-term decisions 
There are many similarities between the short-term and long-term models. In both models 
• GENCOs attempt to maximize gains in the market. 
• Decisions of GENCO are limited by economic and technical constraints on them. 
• Decisions of GENCO are affected by demand and competitors' action. 
• Decisions of GENCO are affected by fuel and other markets. 
• Decisions of GENCOs are both sequential decision-making and dynamic. 
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9.3.2 Differences between short-term and long-term decisions 
There are many differences between long-term and short-term decisions for GENCOs. These differences are 
classified into three groups: economic differences, technical differences, and other differences, as summarized in 
Tables 9.1-9.3. 
Table 9.1 Different economic constraints for short-term and long-term decisions 
Short-term: Long-term 
Time 
scale 
•Few days - few months 
•No time value of money is 
considered 
• More than 1-3 years. 
• Time value of money must be taken into 
account 
Gain to 
maximize 
• Short-term profit maximization 
• With less risk and uncertainty 
• Long-term expected profit maximization 
• With more risk and uncertainty 
Cost Short-run cost 
• Fuel cost 
• Operating cost 
Long-run cost 
• Fuel cost 
• Operating cost 
• Return of investment (opportunity cost) 
• Depreciation 
Table 9.2 Different technical constraints for short-term and long-term decisions 
Short-term Long-term 
Generation Type 
selection 
No Yes 
Static Technical 
Constraints 
• Pmin and Pmax (capacity limitation) 
• Shut-down time 
• Shut-down cost 
• Start-up time 
• Startup cost 
• Banking cost 
•Available generation type 
•Environments constraints 
(emissions); 
Dynamic Technical 
Constraints 
Ramp rate limitation (for hourly 
schedule) 
•Maximum Expansion rate 
(related to construction rate) 
Table 9.3 Different demand properties for short-term and long-term decisions 
Short-term Long-term 
Demand changes Small May be large 
Demand forecast Necessary Very important 
9.4 Generation long-term decision-making as a real options problem 
GENCO long-term decision-making has been evolving with changes in electric market. Before 
deregulation, generation capacity planning was mainly about minimizing cost to reliably meet demand for the 
future time [Wang, 1994]. Typical generation planning models include generation planning optimization 
according to generating units (WASP) and according to the power plant (JASP). 
With electric industry deregulation, GENCO has become financially independent and a future demand is not 
assured. It becomes very essential for GENCOs to integrate the analysis of investment and financing decisions to 
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generation capacity planning in new environment [Majumdar, 1999][Khatib,1997][Subramaniam, 1998]. The 
new generation capacity models are mostly distinguished from the traditional planning models in that the goal of 
optimization is not minimizing cost but maximizing net worth of the company. Meanwhile, risk in the market 
must be managed for GENCOs to survive and succeed. Project valuation and portfolio management based on 
option pricing theory and decision analysis has been studied [Siddiqi, 2000]. The objective is to maximize the 
expected utility to manage market risk, instead of minimizing cost or maximizing deterministic profit. 
Real options is a good method to manage risk efficiently for decision makers [Copeland, 2001] [Amram, 
1999]. It has been tentatively applied in study of GENCO long-term planning decisions [Wang, 2001]. The 
author of this work believes that real options is an excellent tool to study GENCOs' long-term decisions and 
should be applied in the future. Interaction among different GENCOs in the long-term expansion process should 
also be included in electric market dynamics. 
All previous models developed in the short-term market dynamics simulation are applicable to the long-
term market dynamics study with proper modifications, including changes in GENCOs' objectives and 
constraints as shown in section 9.3. 
In long-term expansion process, Stackelberg-like model-leader and follower-seems very appropriate to 
model interactions among GENCOs. This is because currently electric market is usually oligopolistic and if one 
GENCO makes a decision to expand its capacity, other GENCOs have to take this commitment into account 
when making their own decisions. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK SUGGESTIONS 
10.1 Summary 
The evolving of the electric market all over the world is still ongoing. Electric market dynamic problems 
have been met during this process and will exist in future because deregulation of electricity industry is so new 
and far from the end. The models and methods presented in this dissertation are not meant to provide easy 
answers to these problems. Rather, this study tries to develop methods of studying complex market system and 
market participant behaviors in a relatively simple way without loss of the essence of the problems and take 
advantages of existing techniques, such as systems theory, decision analysis, and decision theory. 
10.2 Conclusions 
Electric market dynamic problems do exist, both in practical markets and simulation results. Since 
electricity is such an important commodity, dynamic analysis is necessary to detect possible problems and 
improve market design. Electric markets, including market organization and market participants, can be studied 
as a control system using system theory. GENCOs' optimal decision-makings can be seen as control processes. 
Market performances, as well as market properties as control systems, can be obtained. The following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
• Price/quantity equilibrium, market share, and market power depend on all system parameters except 
fixed generation cost ci0 . ci0 does not influence market stability and equilibrium;. 
• In the market under quantity competition with only price information feedback, the market is neither 
controllable nor observable. When a demand-met-error is introduced, the market may become 
controllable but still unobservable. Market administrators may change market output through input. 
However, GENCOs' output can not be observed from market output; 
• Under both quantity and price competition, quantity competition and price competition are closely 
correlated. Both competitions should be studied at the same time to evaluate market properties. 
• Interactions between GENCOs are important to GENCO decisions and market performance; 
Expectations of other GENCOs' actions and interactions between GENCOs are proved to be important 
to GENCO decision-making and market performance. 
Compared with equilibrium analysis, modeling market and decision-making of GENCOs using systems theory 
provide lot of unique information in market, such as market stability, achievability of equilibrium (and other 
properties of equilibrium), and dynamic transition processes. 
Properties of GENCOs and their decisions have important effects on market performance. Sometimes their 
actions cause market dynamic problems, such as highly volatile prices. The following conclusions are drawn: 
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• A lower marginal cost of a GENCO usually gives the GENCO more market power. Interventions from 
market administrators become necessary when a GENCO gains overly high market power; 
• Under quantity competition, with linear demand function, a more inelastic demand (with less — ) may 
b 
give GENCOs more market power. This may not be valid under both quantity and price competition. 
Interventions from market administrators become necessary when GENCOs have overly high market 
power; 
• Different expectations, either different types of expectations or same kind of expectation with different 
parameters that GENCOs use, result in different GENCOs decisions, market performance and 
transition processes. It happens even when the market has the same demand and GENCOs have same 
production cost; 
• Under some expectations with inaccurate parameters, GENCOs' legitimate decisions to maximize 
profit without violating market rules can lead to highly volatile or extremely high market prices. This 
reveals problems with market design and interventions from market administrators then become 
necessary; 
• When there is uncertainty, probability distributions of estimate of the other GENCO s output influence 
GENCOs' decision making and market properties. Generally, the market is less dynamic when 
GENCOs adopts fixed probabilistic expectation based on past market price and competition. 
Decision analysis and decision theory are good methods for GENCOs to systematically solve decision 
problems in electric market with technical and economic constraints with and without uncertainty. In new 
deregulated environment full of risk, GENCOs should apply decision analysis and decision theory in decision­
making processes in both short term (i.e., market-based probabilistic generation scheduling) and long term (i.e., 
market-based probabilistic generation expansion). 
Short-term generation scheduling should be market-based to take into account demand properties and 
competitors' actions for GENCOs to maximize profit. It should also be probabilistic for GENCOs to manage 
risk. The GENCO optimal decision problem in short-term electric market is a three-dimension problem: how to 
develop market-based probabilistic generation schedule and make bidding decisions at the same time for each 
service market in each geographical market. Market-based generation scheduling procedures for GENCOs to 
make generation and bidding decisions in short-term electric market with different constraints have been 
developed and prove to be able to maximize gain for GENCOs. Market-based generation scheduling in different 
situations (with certainty and uncertainty, in multiple geographical markets, and in multiple service markets) can 
be formulated as Dynamic Programming problems. Results from numerical examples show Dynamic 
Programming is effective. Stochastic Dynamic Programming should be used when there is uncertainty in 
demand and competitors' actions for GENCOs to mange risk. 
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Long-term decision-making for GENCOs-market-based probabilistic generation expansion-has been 
compared with short-term decisions. The author believes that real options is a good method for GENCOs to 
make long-term decisions and choose expansion projects. Interactions between GENCOs should be included in 
long-term GENCO decisions to find optimal decision and build long-term market models. 
10.3 Suggested future work 
How to use systems theory to model and simulate electric market dynamics has been studied. This will help 
predict and identify possible market design flaws. The next question would be "how to use those models to 
develop schemes for electric market administrators and designers to control market properties when it is 
necessary?" To answer this question, control scheme in different market situations need to be designed in future 
work. As an advantage of studying electric market using systems theory, conclusions in systems theory to design 
control schemes can be applied since electric markets have already been modeled as control systems. 
Market-based generation scheduling has been studied for GENCOs. In short-term, GENCOs may also trade 
in financial markets using different financial tools [Richter, 1998]. This will help GENCOs manage risk and 
most importantly, maximize total profit in all available markets. An optimal decision-making model, which 
includes all technical constraints, market conditions (including demand properties and possible competitor's 
actions), and financial constraints in all physical and financial markets to find the best decisions in all markets, 
should be developed. Such decision-making models can then be used to study dynamics of electric market 
systems, including both physical markets and financial markets. 
In this study, market-based probabilistic generation scheduling problem has been studied. How GENCOs 
should include uncertainty in market into their decisions is shown. Value at risk is a good way to systematically 
include uncertainty into decision-making and achieve certain level of confidence for decision maker [Jorion, 
2001]. In future work, value at risk may be introduced into market-based probabilistic generation decision­
making model to find optimal decisions for GENCOs to control risk while considering all technical constraints, 
market conditions and financial constraints. 
I l l  
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